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Abstract
Romanian-American relations between 1938 and 1940 evolved at an oscillating
path and developed asymmetrically according to the pattern o f a big power-small power
relationship. This period presents particularly interesting features due to international
trends and the evolution o f Romanian internal situation.
The United States did not consider the East Central European region (where
Romania was situated) to have a specific importance for its national interest. Therefore,
the foreign policy decision-makers o f the State Department did not designed a strategy
toward East Central Europe in the interwar period. M oreover, this region had little to
offer to the United States strategically, economically, and politically.
Neither Romania nor the United States had important political and economic
interests in the other. Their material and political resources were different. Especially
Romania confronted serious economic problems which impaired her abilities to develop
sound trade relations with and to pay her debt to the United States in the interwar period.
The rapid advance o f Germany in East Central Europe compelled Romania to ask
the United States for assistance in armaments and raw materials. This initiative in
Rom ania’s arms’ imports constituted a new and original departure from the previous
decade. Romanian officials requested credits and loans from American private banks and
manufacturers but they did not succeed in their quest due to Romania’s poor payment
abilities.
The American journalists and diplomats active in the Balkans informed accurately
and regularly the State Department about the aggressive economic policy o f the Third

Reich and anticipated Romania’s weak chances to resist to Germany’s drive to the East.
They also identified that country as crucial in the German “drang nach Osten” due to her
natural resources such as oil and grains. Unfortunately, Romania suffered during the
entire interwar period from a poor public image which presented her to the
American public as an exotic, politically and ethnically troubled Balkans kingdom.
The United States did not have any notable strategic, military, or economic interest
in Romania at the time o f Germany’s march in the Balkans. Despite the warnings o f
American diplomats and journalists, the State Department could not connect the
developments in this area with the fate o f the United States and did not design an active
policy to prevent its falling into Germany’s sphere o f influence.
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Introduction
The history o f Romanian-American relations has always followed an uneven path.
Although some historians on both sides o f the ocean have tried to demonstrate the
existence o f a long durable friendship between Romania and the United States, all
evidence indicates that their relationship developed asymmetrically according to the typical
pattern o f relations between a great power and a small one throughout the entire interwar
and post World W ar II period.
Romanian-American relations began in 1859 when Henry Romertze arrived in
Galati as the first American consul to both Romanian principalities. Up to 1881, when
Romania was recognized by the Great Powers as independent from the moribund Turkish
Empire, the United States had hesitated in opening a diplomatic legation in Bucharest.
Only in 1881, the United States and Romania began their “ordinary relations between
equal political and commercial partners, as equal states.” 1 Their relationship continued to
develop in the twentieth century and intensified and expanded somewhat during the 1920s
and 1930s. The tw o years on the eve o f World War II present some interesting features
due to the increased interest o f American State Department and the American media
tow ard Romania.
One such feature is the American government’s response from 1938 to 1940 to the
internal situation in Romania, especially the establishment o f King Carol II’s personal
authoritarian regime and the intensification o f anti-Semitic measures. At that time,

1Ion Stanciu and Paul Cemovodeanu, Distant Lands: The Genesis and Evolution o f
Romanian-American Relations (Boulder, Colorado: East European M onographs, 1985),
p. 214.

2

Romania tried to survive German attempts to monopolize its oil and grains exports as well
as to undermine the country’s internal stability by manipulating the Iron Guard, an
autochthonous extreme right-wing organization.
On the other hand, Americans and their elected representatives became
increasingly isolationists during the early to mid-1930s. Congress, out o f the desire to
avoid involving America in another European war, voted the Neutrality Acts o f 1935,
1937, and 1939. The genesis o f these acts, according to Secretary o f State Cordell Hull,
dated back to the 1934 “hearings o f the Nye Committee, established by the Senate to
investigate the manufacture and sale o f arms and munitions.”2 President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and his foreign policy advisors occasionally tried to convince the Congress o f
the desirability o f renouncing strict neutrality and allowing the United States to involve
itself more in the European events. Also, some officials o f the Department o f State
anticipated the increasing importance o f East Central and Eastern Europe in keeping the
peace.
During the 1920s, Romania had oriented its economic and foreign policies toward
W estern Europe and its Eastern European neighbors. Despite being the second largest
state in area and population in East Central Europe, it did not aspire to act as a great
pow er in the interwar period. Romania’s foreign policy was based on two regional
alliances, the Little Entente and the Balkans Entente, as well as on collective security
through the League o f Nations. After the M arch 15, 1939, Nazi occupation o f Bohemia
and Moravia, the Romanian government’s view o f the national interest required an

2 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs. Volume 1 (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1948), p. 398.
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economic, and later a political, shift toward Germany. Armand Calinescu, Romania’s
Prime Minister, described the economic agreement with Germany o f M arch 22, 1939, as
having been dictated by Romania’s desire to retain its borders.3 Even so, not until July
1940, Romania did completely renounce its western orientation and turn to Germany for
military and political assistance. On the eve o f World W ar II, Romania because o f its rich
oil resources came to be perceived by the American media and some American diplomats
as the most important country in Germany’s drive to European domination and world
power. The American Minister in Bucharest, Franklin Gunther M ott, perceptively and
promptly informed the State Department about Romania’s gradual international isolation
and her expected orientation towards Germany.
Despite these warnings and Romania’s desperate requests to the W estern powers
for armament, the United States maintained a prudent distance from Romania’s problems
so long as American citizens or their interests were not harmed. American officials
watched carefully the evolution o f events in East Central Europe but took no concrete
diplomatic or economic action to prevent Romania from slipping into Germany’s orbit.
The American national interest did not at this time call for any intervention in Europe,
especially in the eastern part. This thesis will attempt to explain why American officials,
despite warnings and alarm signals from the East European Division o f the State
Department and the Bucharest Legation, did not chose to meet Romania’s requests for
assistance during the late 1930s.

3 Armand Calinescu, Insemnari politice (Political Notes) (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 1992),
p. 235.
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To date, little has been written or published about the history o f RomanianAmerican relations. The period between 1938 and 1940 has not attracted historians’
interest, and no book specifically addresses the relationship between Romania and the
United States in the late 1930s, especially due to the evolution o f Romanian political life
during King Carol’s dictatorship. The Romanian historiography during the communist
period did not care to deal with issues such as the international implications o f King Carol
IP s dictatorship or the Soviet-Romanian relations.
The principal primary sources for this thesis are the unpublished dispatches o f the
American Minister in Bucharest, Franklin Gunther M ott, from the National Archives,
Washington, D C., the Record Group 84, containing general records o f the American
Legation in Bucharest between 1938 and 1940, and the published documents in the
collection Foreign Relations o f the United States.
Secondary sources include articles from contemporary magazines and newspapersLife. Time. The New Republic. Current History, and The New York Times, contemporary
books about Europe in the late 1930s, works on King Carol II o f Romania and his
authoritarian regime, especially by foreign correspondents stationed in Bucharest on the
eve o f World W ar II, monographs and collection o f articles on both American and
Romanian foreign policy in the twentieth century, memoirs and diaries o f political leaders
and diplomats-Cordell Hull, Grigore Gafencu, Armand Calinescu, and King Carol II.
This thesis, without pretending to exhaust all sources, will examine economic,
diplomatic, and political aspects o f the relations between the United States and Romania
as well as some specific issues discussed in the American press between 1938-1940.

5

Further research would have to consider other important issues o f the relationship
between the two countries, such as ethnicity—the role o f Romanian-Americans in
developing the relations—and cultural exchanges.
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Chapter 1—Romanian-American Relations, 1918-1938
Romanian-American relations developed at a rapid pace between 1918 and 1938
comparing to the preceding decades. In 1918, the Romanian government acknowledged
the contributions o f the United States in achieving Allied victory and for a short time
opened a legation in Washington. The first Romanian envoy was Dr. Constantin
Angelescu whose mission was to promote Romania’s national cause in the United States.1
In the 1920s, Romania’s image abroad suffered from the bad publicity given especially to
Prince Carol and his morganatic marriage with the commoner Zizi Lambrino in 1918 as
well as his letter o f renunciation to the throne at the end o f 1925. The press worldwide
avidly exploited Carol’s affairs. As one author, Konrad Bercovici noted, “the royal
household o f Romania became the smallpox o f the world’s newspaperdom.”2 No matter
how harsh these words may seem, they accurately express the fact that the most sordid
details o f the Romanian monarchy were front-page news in the 1920s.
The relations between Romania and the United States in the second and third
decade o f the twentieth century were dominated by important issues such as the Romanian
w ar debt, the uncertain status o f Bessarabia, discrimination against Romanian Jews, and
imbalances in Romania’s foreign trade. These problems hindered the improvement o f

1For more information concerning the mission o f Dr. Angelescu in the United States, see
Valeriu Dobrinescu, “Cu privire la Misiunea Nationala Romana in Statele Unite ale
Americii” (Concerning the Romanian National Legation in the United States) in Profesorul
C. Cihodaru la a 75-a aniversare (Professor C. Cihodaru at the 75th Birthday) (Iasi:
Universitatea “Al. I.Cuza,” 1983), pp. 180-194.
2Konrad Bercovici, That Roval Lover (New York: Brewer & Warren, 1931), p. 10.
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U.S.-Romanian relations and helped persuade to State Department officials and American
private businessmen to proceed cautiously in all dealings with Romania.

War Debts
Romania’s war debts to the United States—$36.1 million—were fifth in size among
those o f the six successor to Austria-Hungary states who had borrowed from America
during or immediately after World War I.3 The borrowers from the United States except
Finland defaulted on their debt after the Hoover M oratorium.4 Finland was able to pay its
debts because o f its favorable balance o f payments in dollars.5 In the years following the
Paris Peace Conference, Romania made several attempts to establish reasonable means o f
payment o f its American debt. One effort to reschedule the debt occurred in December
1925. Nicolae Titulescu, chief o f the Romanian delegation to Washington, at that time
Romanian Minister in London, conducted the negotiations that led to a convention
between Romania and the United States, signed on December 4, 1925. The final
Romanian debt as defined by the agreement had amounted to $ 44,590,000, but interest
had raised it to $ 122,506,260.6

3Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia had borrowed more than Romania.
4 President Herbert Hoover proposed in 1932 a moratorium on intergovernmental debts
and reparations. The Moratorium was mainly designed to shore up Germany’s banking
structure but lost much o f its effect due to France’s late response and proved insufficient
to stop the liquidation o f assets after the beginning o f the Great Depression.
5Harold G. Moulton, Leo Pasvolsky, World War Debt Settlements (New York, 1926),
pp. 79-80.
6 Valeriu Dobrinescu, Romania si Statele Unite ale Americii (Romania and the United
States o f America) (Iasi: Editura Universitatii “Al. I. Cuza,” 1989), p. IX.
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In 1929, the Romanian Government and the Standard Oil Co. o f New Jersey
agreed on the size o f the American company’s claim for destruction o f property o f its
affiliate, the Romano-Americana company in 1916.7 The Romanian Ministry o f Finance
evaluated the destruction o f company’s property at $ 2,099,900, an amount accepted by
the Romano-Americana. On August 24, 1929, the American company received
$ 89,245,15.9 dollars, representing interest payments up to June 1929. Two days later,
the initial sum was completed by Romanian government bonds in L50 and $100
denominations in a total value o f $ 2,099,900 redeemable in 1965.8

Bessarabian problem
Despite the efforts o f the Romanian government, the Bessarabian question
remained unresolved throughout the interwar period. On August 10, 1920, the American
Secretary o f State, Bainbridge Colby, declared that the United States would not recognize
any dismemberment o f the Russian Empire unless it was first approved by a representative
Russian government.9 The situation did not improve in the following years despite the
efforts o f Romanian representatives to Washington, Gheorghe Bibescu and especially
Charles Davilla, to obtain a definite stand on the part o f the U.S. government.

7Due to an agreement with the W estern powers, its allies, Romania destroyed its oil
refineries before the Germans entered the oil-rich area in the fall o f 1916.
8 Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1929. vol. Ill (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1930), pp. 757-758. Hereafter cited FRU S.
9 Ibid., 1920, vol. Ill, p. 427, 430.
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In the context o f Disarmament Conference o f Geneva and the failure o f RussianRomanian negotiations in Riga,10 the Romanian Minister to the U.S., Charles Davilla,
questioned Department o f State officials about the American attitude toward Bessarabia.
The Chief o f the Division o f Near Eastern Affairs, Wallace Murray, noted that Davilla
coupled the success o f the Disarmament Conference on the solving o f the Bessarabian
question. Davilla thought that the recognition o f Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia
would make the Soviets reconsider their stubborn position and seek a solution to the
problem. M oreover, the Romanian Minister cited as precedent the American recognition
o f the possession o f Vilna by Poland, despite the territorial disputes that still existed
between Poland and Lithuania.11 Davilla even spoke with American Undersecretary o f
State, William Castle, about the U.S. attitude in the event o f Russian aggression toward
Bessarabia but he obtained no commitment to an American intervention. William Castle
wrote in his memorandum, “I did not propose to commit myself as to probable American
action in case o f a very hypothetical and improbable attack on the part o f Russia.” 12
Wallace Murray suggested as a compromise solution the inclusion o f the
Bessarabian quota in the Romanian immigration quota13 because “such a procedure”
would constitute “ipso facto a recognition o f that territory as Rumanian soil.” 14

10 For the failure o f the Romanian-Soviet negotiations at Riga see W alter M. Bacon,
Behind Closed Doors: Secret Papers on the Failure o f Romanian-Soviet Negotiations.
1931-1932 ( Stanford. California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979).
11 FRUS. 1932, vol. II, pp. 503-508.
12 Ibid.
13 According to the U.S. immigration regulations, Romania was among the countries
which were allotted an immigration quota.
14 FRUS, 1932, vol. II, pp. 503-508.

M oreover, he suggested that the State Department authorize the American delegates to
Geneva “to express approval o f the Rumanian contention that Soviet Russia in the non
aggression p a c t... should agree to refrain from any acts o f aggression beyond the Dniester
River (present boundary between Bessarabia and Soviet Russia).” 15
American officials took no concrete action in 1932 or 1933, although following the
election o f Franklin Delano Roosevelt in November 1932, they began to consider
recognizing the Soviet Union, a step which would have made even more difficult any U.S.
recognition o f Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. Following M urray’s advice,
Cordell Hull, the new U.S. Secretary o f State, favored the inclusion o f Bessarabia within
the Romanian immigration quota as a compromise solution. Paul Quinlan argued that Hull
“told the President that this would have the effect o f according American recognition to
Rumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia.” 16 But the United States never recognized “de
jure” the union o f Bessarabia with Romania.

Commercial Relations
The United States was the only country with whom Romania registered an
unfavorable balance o f trade the entire interwar period. In 1924, the Bureau o f Foreign
and Domestic Commerce o f the Department o f Commerce published a brochure entitled
Rumania: An Economic Handbook in which it described the past and the prospects o f

15 Ibid.
16 Paul Quinlan, Clash over Romania: British and American Policies tow ard Romania.
1938-1947 (Los Angeles: American Romanian Academy for Arts and Sciences, 1977),
p. 23.

11

Romanian-American commercial relations. According to this book, in 1921, American
exports to Romania, composed primarily o f agricultural machinery and iron pipes, rose to
$ 5,037,989. But exports from Romania to the U.S., consisting mostly o f mustard seed,
walnuts, hog bristles, and skins, amounted only to $ 238,346.17 The brochure concluded
optimistically that:
The establishment in the United States o f a branch o f the largest Rumanian
commercial bank, the activities o f the American-Rumanian Chamber o f
Commerce at New York, the strengthening o f diplomatic and consular
representation in the United States, the establishment o f direct steamship
service between New York and Constantza, and the eventual payment o f
Rumania’s obligations to the American Govemment--all should have some
influence upon Romanian exports to this country.18

Unfortunately, the optimism o f the U.S. Department o f Commerce was far from being
justified because the value o f American exports to Romania continued to be larger than
that o f American imports o f Romanian products.
In the second half o f the 1920s, Romania began to import electrical appliances,
radios, and automobiles from the United States. In 1926, the first radios o f American
manufacture penetrated Romania together with 489 American automobiles manufactured
by Ford, Chevrolet, Buick, and Dodge. Actually, in that year Romania became the
country in South Eastern Europe with largest number o f automobiles in circulation,
16,700. In the 1930s, Romania continued to import automobiles and parts, electrical

1d e p a rtm e n t o f Commerce, Rumania: An Economic Handbook (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1924), p. 146, 157.
18 Ibid., p. 157.
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machinery, and agricultural machinery from the United States. M oreover, in 1936,
General M otors opened a store for selling parts, radios, and refrigerators in Bucharest.19
The Romanian-American trade seemed to improve at the end o f the 1920s.
Through the new Romanian-American commercial treaty signed in December 1929,
Romania received most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters.20 Unfortunately, the
economic depression o f 1929-1933 led to a diminution o f American capital market and a
reduction o f the U.S. investments in the states o f East Central Europe. As Ion Stanciu
revealed, the commercial trade was limited because o f payment policy differences that
existed between the tw o countries. The United States preferred that all exchange be in
hard currency. However, Romania favored trade between the countries be valued as trade
credits, and such credits be settled without the use o f hard currency. The Romanian
position was based on a 1932 policy that the state had a monopoly on hard currency
commercial trade.

*7

1

In 1935, the Romanian customs figures for 1934, cited in a telegram o f the
American Minister to Bucharest, Alvin Owsley, to the Secretary o f State Hull, showed
that American exports to Romania amounted to $ 5,440,000 (544,000,000 lei) in contrast
to Romanian exports to the United States which amounted to S 160,000 (16,000,000 lei).
Therefore, the Romanian Ministry o f Industry and Commerce suspended “authorizations
for the importation o f American merchandise pending the conclusion o f an arrangement

19 Ion Stanciu, “Relatii comerciale romano-americane in perioada interbelica” (RomanianAmerican Relations in the Interwar Period) Revista de Istorie (Historical Journal) I
(1981): 114,125.
20 Dobrinescu. Romania and the United States, p. XI.
21 Stanciu, p. 123.
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safe-guarding the interests o f the two parties.”22 This decision was not as radical as it
seemed, but it worried the American government.23
Valeriu Dobrinescu pointed out that no development occurred in the following
three years to improve trade relations between Romania and the United States. The
above-mentioned author cited a dispatch from the American Charge d ’Affairs in Romania,
Frederick Hibbard, in which he complained o f “the diminishing volume o f our export trade
to Rumania caused by the artificial barriers o f clearing agreements, exchange restrictions
and import quotas.” The Romanian reply, coming from Victor Badulescu, the
Undersecretary o f State for Foreign Affairs, attributed the situation to “the inability o f the
Rumanian government to secure dollars.”24
The main concern o f American businessmen, as expressed through the American
legation in Bucharest, was the alleged discrimination against their interests in favor o f
those o f European powers, particularly France. An illustration o f this concern was the
case o f Consolidated Aircraft Co. o f Buffalo, New York. In 1933, the Romanian
government intended to purchase airplane equipment and called for bids for certain types
and quality o f airplanes. Consolidated Aircraft was the only American company to make a
bid to the Romanian government in competition with Polish and French manufacturers.
Radu Irimescu, the Air Minister, considered the American bid to be the most appropriate
and recommended to the Council o f Ministers the purchase o f twenty American training

22 FRUS. 1935, p. 256.
23 For details, see Dobrinescu, p. LXVI.
24 Ibid., p. LXVTI.
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aircraft.25 The Romanian Prime Minister at that time, I.Gh. Duca, who had to sign the
order because the Air Minister could not personally authorize the transaction, postponed
the approval o f the contract. The American Minister in Bucharest, Alvin Owsley,
considered the delay to be a discriminatory action against American manufacturers. “It
was perfectly apparent to my mind,” wrote the American Minister in Bucharest, “that the
discrimination was certainly there. The way was completely clear for the purchase o f the
military airplanes o f American manufacture and the deal was ready to be consumed, and
for some unknown reason the Air Ministry was prevented from making the purchase.”26
Owsley even speculated about the possible source o f the “outside” influence controlling
the Rumanian ministers which he thought it was exclusively French.27 In his telegram o f
February 27, 1934, the American Minister expanded his allegations by stating that
“extremely strong pressure was brought to bear by the French against the purchase o f
what they termed ‘foreign planes,’ that is, airplanes manufactured by a foreign country,
and presumably, the influence was most forcibly centered against the U.S.”28 There was
no concrete p ro o f to support Owsley allegations in this case. M oreover, eventually
Consolidated Aircraft Co. did get the contract and began delivering the planes in M arch
1934.
Another area o f confrontation between the American business interest and
Romanian instructions was motion pictures. The sound film equipment in Romanian

25 National Archives, Washington, U.S., 871.248.Consolidated Aircraft Co./5. Hereafter
cited N,A „ 8 7 1 ,2 4 8 ,0 A./,
26 N.A., 871.248.C.A./1.
27 Ibid.
28 N.A., 871.248.C.A./5.
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theaters was mostly American. In 1930, out of the thirty-three local theaters in which
sound equipment was installed, twenty-two used American equipment manufactured at
W estern Electric, Moviephone, Biophone, and Pacent.29 (O f the others, six were German,
two were French, two were Austrian, and one was Hungarian). This situation made
Romania a good market for American talking pictures. But the alleged discrimination
against American business interests arose. The most vocal protests came from the M otion
Picture Producers and Distributors o f America (MPPDA), known also as the Hays Office
after its first president, Will Hays. Created in 1922 by the big Hollywood studios,
M PPDA handled all international distribution problems, among other responsibilities. The
organization worked closely with the Department o f Commerce to sanction any country
whose policies endangered the American motion picture industry’s interests.30 Romania
was no exception.
In 1934, the Romanian Ministry o f Interior issued instructions concerning the
dubbing o f motion pictures in Romania. Thereupon, M PPDA asked the American
Legation in Bucharest “to take action calculated to improve conditions” for American
films in Romania.31 Synchronization in Romanian language appeared as an expensive and
sterile venture to the American movie-makers. In a letter o f Frederick Herron, Foreign

29N.A., 871.4061. M otion Pictures/3. Hereafter cited N.A., 871.4061.MP/.
30 For details about overseas operations o f the MPPDA, see Ian Jarvie, Hollywood’s
Overseas Campaign: The North Atlantic Movie Trade. 1920-1950 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992). Jarvie noted, “At the Department o f Commerce, the
M otion Picture Division, which had been created as a section o f Specialties Division in
1926 and elevated to division status in July 1929, was merged back into Specialties in July
1933 for purposes o f economy. In 1936, Herron lobbied for its restoration as a separate
division, a move that was made the following year.” (p. 340).
31 N.A., 871.4061.MP/5.
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M anager at M PPDA and brother-in-law o f Will Hays, Romania’s decision was considered
“a very good example o f how ... small countries were trying to shake our industry down.
It was commercially impossible for any company to dub a picture just for the Romanian
m arket.”32 This action was eventually abandoned partly due to external pressure and
unproductive costs for local distributors.
In 1936, the Romanian government issued a decree prohibiting the use o f subtitles
and superimposed titles in any other language than Romanian on foreign films released in
Romania. Harold Smith, European Representative o f the Hays Organization, immediately
protested from his office in Paris. He considered this action to be direct discrimination
against the American motion picture industry “because if the Rumanian Government
forced us to take off our films the superimposed titles in Hungarian and German but at the
same time permitted Hungarian and German films to be shown it would force our films out
o f the market.”33 This controversy actually addressed the Transylvanian market for
American movies because a large part o f the population in that region spoke either
Hungarian or German.
Leland Harrison, the American Minister at Bucharest, did not believe Romania was
discriminating against U.S. films because its regulations applied to all films shown in
Romania. He also found out that the provision was made “at the request o f the interested
distributors in Rumania: Behr and Follender, local distributors for W arner Bros.;
Zaharovici, manager o f the organization distributing M etro-Goldwyn-M ayer films;

32 N.A., 871.4061.MP/6.
33 N.A., 871.4061.MP/12.

17

Kazazis, distributor o f R.K.O. pictures; and Sitter, local distributor for Paramount.”34 In
the end, the dubbing o f American motion pictures proved to be beneficial for the U.S.
distributors. Eliminating the practice o f showing American films in Transylvania with
subtitles in Hungarian and German brought savings for local distributors because the cost
o f importing extra prints was eliminated and thereby widened the market for American
movies in this region.

The Jewish “Question”
Almost from their beginning, Romanian-American relations were dominated by the
minorities problem. Romania’s treatment o f Jews was questioned by the Great Powers
since the 1878 Peace Congress o f Berlin. The European powers recognized Romanian
sovereignty only after obliging the Romanian government to eliminate article 77 from the
1866 Constitution that stipulated that only Christians could receive Romanian citizenship.
According to one historian, G. M. Razi, during the Congress, “Bayard Taylor, the
American minister to Germany, actively lobbied several members o f the Congress for ‘the
enforcement o f religious liberty in Rumania, Bulgaria, and East Roumelia,’ noting that this
was the chief interest which the Government and the people o f the United States had in
the treaty.”35

34 Ibid.
35 G.M. Razi, “Reflections on the First Sixty Years,” in The United States and Romania:
American-Romanian Relations in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Paul Quinlan (Woodland
Hills, California: American Romanian Academy for Arts and Sciences, 1988), p. 20.
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After 1878, the Romanian government modified indeed the constitution to allow
non-Christians to achieve citizenship but introduced qualifying provisions, such as a ten
years’ residency requirement, or the fact that only Romanian citizens could acquire land.
The American reaction to these limitations came on October 30, 1879. According to
G.M. Razi, when it learned about these constitutional amendments, the Union o f American
Hebrew Congregations urged Secretary o f State Evarts not to recognize Romania as
independent.36 Even though the protest was given consideration by the State Department,
the recognition o f Romania by France, Germany, and Great Britain determined the United
States to open the first American legation at Bucharest under Eugene Schuyler. His
successor was Benjamin Peixotto, son o f a Jewish doctor and president o f the Supreme
Lodge o f B ’nai B ’rith who was appointed by President Grant to keep the U.S. informed
about the status o f Jews in Romania.37
In order to understand the complicated Jewish problem o f Romania, one needs to
look at the history o f Jewish emigration to this country. Most o f the Jewish immigrants in
the 1700s came from the Hapsburg Empire, but starting with 1830s large numbers o f
Polish and Russian Jews came to Romania after fleeing from Russian pogroms. They
settled mostly in Moldova, and soon became the majority o f inhabitants in cities like
Falticeni, Dorohoi, Botosani, and Iasi. After 1918, when Romania was united with its
long lost territories, Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina, the minorities’ question
became more acute. From a small, insignificant country in East Central Europe, Romania

36 Ibid., p. 21.
37 Ibid, p. 18.

had become the second largest state in area and population o f this region, with a large
number o f Hungarian, German, Jewish, and Ukrainian minorities.38
The American press and American Jewish organizations very actively campaigned
against Romania’s treatment o f minorities. As a consequence, Romania’s image in the
United States was negative. Moreover, American officials were uninformed about the
similarly oppressive condition under which Romanians had existed in the AustroHungarian and Russian Empires. Among Romanians, the United States was not well
known either. During World War I, thanks primarily to the American Red Cross aid, and
the friendly attitude o f Charles Vopicka, American Minister in Bucharest, America came
to be associated with generosity and humanity, among others.
The relationship between the United States and Romania soured during the Paris
Peace Conference o f 1919-1920. The Romanian delegation, led by Prime Minister I.I.C.
Bratianu, encountered Allied disapproval o f Romania’s treatment o f national and religious
minorities. On May 28, 1919, a decree was issued to naturalize Romanian Jews by
endowing every resident Jew with Romanian citizenship if he or she had been bom in
Romania and was citizen o f no other country. But that was not enough for the Allies.
Poland, Romania, the Kingdom o f Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia, after 1927),
Czechoslovakia, and Greece were obliged to sign a Minorities Treaty, targeted mainly to
give equal status to Jews. The Romanian Prime Minister considered this treaty to be a

38 Before the war (1912), only eight percent o f the Romanian population was foreign. The
census o f 1930 indicated that 71.9 percent were Romanians, 7.2 percent Hungarians, 4.1
percent Germans, 4 percent Jewish, and 3 .2 percent Ukrainian. Keith Hitchins, Rumania.
1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 290.
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surrender o f Romanian sovereignty and initially refused to sign it. As historian Ephraim
N atanson commented, Bratianu did not sign either the peace treaty with Austria or the
M inorities’ Treaty until the latter was modified:
A new formulation was intended to present the treaty as an expression o f
the Romanian people’s independent will: “Whereas Rumania desires o f her
own will to give full guarantees and justice.” Also, to present the treaty as
the result o f cooperation between the powers and Romania, it was
stipulated that the parties “have, after examining together, agreed to
conclude the present treaty.” ... Those articles dealing specifically with the
Jews were deleted and the only article remaining to safe-guard Jewish
rights was article seven.39
Article seven stated that Romania was to recognize as its citizens all Jews inhabiting any
Romanian territory. The American officials did not directly address Romania’s refusal to
sign the treaty, but they regarded Bratianu as stubborn and difficult to deal with.
In interwar Romania, the Jewish community hardly formed a united, homogenous
community. O f the total four percent o f Romanians who were Jews, historian Ezra
M endelsohn identified different heterogenical groups.

The Jewish community in the Old

Kingdom was small and Western-oriented, but the one in Moldova encompassed larger
numbers which had an Eastern orientation. The Jews living in the newly-acquired
provinces, Bukovina and Bessarabia, were o f Eastern type, but had different historical
experiences. The first lived under Austrian rule and developed a germanized elite unlike
those in Bessarabia who were oppressed under the Czarist government and did not have
an elite. Finally, the Jews in Transylvania and Banat suffered Hungarian influences and

39 Ephraim Natanson, “Romanian Governments and the Legal Status o f Jews Between the
Two W orld W ars,” Romanian Jewish Studies I (Spring 1987): 55.
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were oriented toward the West. In Crisana and Maramures, most Jewish population came
from Galicia and belonged to the Eastern-type Jewry.40
Irina Livezeanu suggested plausible reasons for Romanian anti-Semitism. She
argued that Jews were relatively more urban and educated than the Romanian population
and constituted an economic and professional elite. Also, “the image o f Jews was further
implicated in and affected by the endless interwar debates about the national essence.”
Because the Jews were “the minority most defended by Western governments and
international institutions, and the most urban and overrepresented minority on Romanian
university rolls,” being anti-Semitic meant being anti-Western and distinctly Romanian.41
In the interwar period, Romanian culture was beset by the search for national identity
which split it in two main intellectual groups, the Europeanists and the traditionalists. The
latter wanted Romania to develop through its own native population and resources,
without copying any Western cultures. In this context, the Jews came to be perceived as
dangerous for the ethnic purity o f the Romanian people and a disturbance o f its natural
inclinations 42
The American preoccupation with the Jewish problem in Romania resulted in
negative articles in newspapers, organized Jewish lobbying o f Congress on behalf o f their
Romanian co-religionists, and delegations to Romania to investigate the status o f
minorities. In 1925 and 1927, the American Committee on the Rights o f Religious

40 Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews o f East Central Europe Between the Two Wars
(Bloomington: Indiana University, 1983), p. 173.
41 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism. Nation Building,
and Ethnic Struggle. 1918-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 13.
42 For the dispute between the two groups, see Hitchins, pp. 292-334.
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Minorities sent tw o commissions to Romania “to investigate the condition o f the racial and
religious minorities embraced within greater Roumania.”43 The 1925 delegation
concentrated its attention on the Transylvanian minorities and discovered that the situation
o f Jews was acceptable but still needed some improvement.
The second commission o f 1927 extended its research to minorities (particularly,
Jews and Baptists) in the Old Kingdom, Maramures, and Banat, as well as in the newly
acquired provinces o f Bessarabia and Bukovina.44 Its report, entitled Roumania: Ten
Years After, was published in 1929 and contained the conclusions o f the commission and
its suggestions to the Romanian government. In their conclusion, the commission
members stated, “There remained a wide discrepancy between the Constitution adopted by
the State which was liberal in many respects, and its enforcement through the officials,
particularly noticeable in the administration o f the outlying districts.”45 The commission
warned in particular against discriminatory actions in the outlying provinces o f Bessarabia
and Bukovina. It also noticed that minority franchise rights were repressed and that the
school laws were not always equitable. The overall conclusion o f the 1927 American
delegation was that “if Roumania cared to put herself in a good position in the eyes o f the
rest o f the world, she would permit the minorities to have the sort o f schools to which
they were accustomed, grant them a reasonable autonomy, and give them the full right to

43 Roumania: Ten Years After (Boston: Beacon Press, 1929), p. V.
44 The members o f this commission were: Dr. Henry Atkinson o f the World Alliance for
International Friendship through the Churches; Reverend R.A. M cGowan o f the Social
Action Department o f the National Catholic Welfare Conference; Dr. John Lathrop, a
Unitarian Minister o f Fullerton, California; and Monsieur Jules Jezequel, the Paris
representative o f the Church Peace Union.” (Ibid.)
45 Ibid., p. 109.

23

teach the historic languages o f their respective peoples as well as the Roumanian
tongue.”46
Anti-Romanian protests continued throughout the 1920s. Queen M arie’s visit to
the United States in the fall o f 1926 gave an opportunity for the American Jews to express
their resentment at the way their co-religionists were discriminated against by the
Romanian government. For example, the first question asked o f the Queen when she
arrived on American soil concerned the treatment o f Jews in Romanian universities.
During her tour, Marie received demands from Jewish community leaders to improve the
situation o f Jews in her country. Dr. Stephen Wise o f the New York Jewish community
convened a conference on the treatment o f Jews in Romania. He found Queen M arie’s
answers to the press so “little reassuring, that I was reluctantly compelled to appeal to
America’s spirit o f fair play.”47 Rabbi Jonah B. Wise made a request to the Queen in the
Central Synagogue, New York, to ease the situation o f Jews in Romania, while
acknowledging the difficulties o f the Romanian government in coping with minority
problems after 1919. “Rumania,” said the Rabbi, “had never been too well-governed and
with a weak machinery could not expect to work political miracles.”48
The ethnic minorities’ problem poisoned American-Romanian relations throughout
the interwar period. As a New York Times editorial o f 1926 pointed out, “good relations
between the two countries could be most easily promoted by unmistakable evidence that

46 Ibid., p. 110.
47 N ew York Times. November 25, 1926, 24.
48 Ibid., November 20, 1926, 18.
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Romania was making proper use o f fruits of the allied victory...”49 Romanian officials
considered the minority question exclusively an internal issue and did not allow any
foreign governments to interfere with the internal policy o f the Romanian state.

Cultural Relations50
In the first three decades o f the twentieth century, cultural relations between
Romania and the U.S. intensified without ever reaching the same high levels as FrancoRomanian and Italo-Romanian relations. Romanians were more inclined toward cultural
contacts with their Latin “brothers” for whom they had felt a greater linguistic and
spiritual affinity than with the Anglo-Saxon countries.
One way to enhance the relations between the two countries was by the
exchanging o f students and exposing them to the culture o f the host country. The simple
fact o f sending 250 Romanians to study in the United States between 1923 and 1935
meant an increased Romanian interest for the New W orld.51 Also, groups o f American
students came to visit Romania and studied different topics. For example, in 1925, a

49 Ibid., November 25, 1926, 24.
50 For more information, see C.C. Giurescu, On Romanian-American Cultural Relations
(New York: Romanian Library, 1972) and Dumitru Dorobat, “Relatii culturale romanoamericane dupa primul razboi mondial” (Romanian-American Cultural Relations after
W orld W ar I), in Relatii romano-americane in timpurile modeme (Romanian-American
Cultural Relations in the M odem Times), ed. by Gheorghe Florescu (Iasi: Editura
Universitatii “Al.I.Cuza,” 1993), pp. 289-312.
51 Dorobat, p. 301. Buletinul Institutului Americano-Roman (Bulletin o f the AmericanRomanian Institute), 1935-1936, gives selective numbers o f students studying in the
United States: 1925-26, 39; 1928-29, 41; 1934-35, 9.
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group o f professors and students from New York University visited Romania to study
immigration patterns.52
B oth Romanian and American friendship societies were created in this period.
Their modest w ork contributed to the popularization o f Romania in the Unites States and
the United States in Romania, enhancing both populations’ knowledge about each other.
In 1926, the “Friends o f the U .S.” (Amicii S.U.A.) was created in Romania as a replica of
the American “Society o f Friends o f Roumania” founded in 1920. Also, in 1924, some
enthusiastic Romanian-Americans, guided by Basil Alexander, founded in New York the
“Sons o f Romania-Association o f American Citizens.”53 These societies sponsored
periodicals—Revista Romano-Americana (Romanian-American Review), Buletinul
Institutului Americano-Roman (Bulletin o f the American-Romanian Institute), Romanian
Quarterly—in which were published valuable articles on America’s culture and daily life;
translations from American literature and poetry; studies o f sociology, political science,
and economics with a special emphasis on the evolution o f Romanian immigration to the
United States; and profiles o f Romanian personalities who visited the New World as well
as their impressions and thoughts. The newspaper America, published in Cleveland,
Ohio, pursued the same kind o f cultural activity by making cultural propaganda among
Romanian-Americans and helping them remember their country o f origin.

52 Dorobat, p, 310,
53 For more information about the latter, see Vasile Hateganu, Romanians o f N ew Y ork.
Part II, Romanian-American Heritage Center Information Bulletin 4 (July-August 1992):
23.
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The Atlantic ocean was not an obstacle to Romanians who wanted to acknowledge
the importance o f and to learn the style o f life in the United States. Among Romanian
personalities who visited the North American continent between 1920-1938 were
Constantin Brancusi with and his famous sculpture “Pasarea maiastra” (Wonderfiil Bird) in
1928; composer and violonist George Enescu in 1924 and 1932; historian Nicolae Iorga,
in 1930; mathematician Gheorghe Titeica, in 1924; and Prince Carol o f Romania (1920)
and Queen Marie o f Romania (1926).
In the interwar period, instead o f translating French or German editions,
Romanians translated directly from English American novels. Jack London, Pearl Buck,
and Louis Bromfield received special attention. Not only American writers but also
scientists attracted the attention o f the Romanian public. As C.C. Giurescu noticed, there
were writings on the life and activity o f Thomas Alva Edison, the inventor o f the
incandescent bulb and o f the phonograph.54 Also, in 1932, Eugen Marius Cioc edited a
book about the life, industrial methods, and economic ideas o f Henry Ford. Two years
later, F ord’s autobiography, Mv Life and W ork (Viata si opera mea) was published in
Bucharest.55

54 The authors on the monographs about Thomas Edison’s life and activity were C. Gh.
Bradateanu in 1932 and G.G. Longinescu in 1936.
55 Giurescu, p. 7.
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Diplomatic relations
Between 1920-1933, the United States opted for a policy o f strict neutrality which
affected its relations with the entire European continent. The Kellog-Briand Pact o f 1928
was a peculiarity in this context. Drafted by Aristide Briand, eminent diplomat and French
Foreign Minister, and Frank Kellogg, U.S. Secretary o f State, the treaty attempted to
outlaw war and to encourage arbitration and diplomacy as the only legal means o f solving
disputes between countries. Romania, who signed the Pact on September 4, 1928, was
among the states that fully supported it in accordance with its pledge for world peace and
security.56 Also, in March 1929, Romania and the United States signed a treaty o f
arbitration and conciliation.
Romania was in the forefront o f East European states which advocated the
containment o f the revisionist states o f Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet
Union, and some collective security solution developed through the League o f Nations.
Nicolae Titulescu, the famous Romanian statesman who was twice in succession elected
president o f the League o f Nations General Assembly, appreciated the American support
“in keeping peace alive on the European continent.”57 He considered the United States to
be a model o f democracy that European nations should emulate. Referring to President
F.D. Roosevelt’s speech at the 150th anniversary o f American Constitution, Titulescu

56 Romania signed also the Litvinoff Protocol o f 1929 which represented the practical
application o f the Pact in Eastern Europe.
57 Nicolae Titulescu* Documente diplomatice (Diplomatic Documents) (Bucuresti: Editura
Politica, 1967), pp. 386-387. For more information about his activity, see W alter Bacon,
Nicolae Titulescu and Romanian Foreign Policy. 1933-1934. (Ph. D. diss., Denver
University, 1975).
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praised the democratic principles o f the U.S. and the President’s indictment o f dictatorship
and rearmament. He further asserted th a t, “Romania could be saved from all dangers by
following ... a democratic internal government and a defense policy o f its frontiers through
mutual assistance pacts with its neighbors.”5* American diplomacy valued Romania’s
efforts to keep peace on the European continent through the consolidation o f the two
regional alliance systems, the Little Entente and the Balkans Entente. As Paul Quinlan
observed, “ ... the U.S. government closely watched Romania’s political developments.
With the growth o f Fascism, the State Department became worried about the future o f
Romania. American ministers in Bucharest sympathized with the non-Fascists, but
carefully refrained from getting involved in domestic affairs.”59
The gradual disintegration o f the international situation in the 1930s worried the
American diplomats and President Roosevelt. The latter was caught between Congress,
which wanted to keep America out o f European “quarrels,” and his own belief that a
German domination o f Europe would ultimately threaten the U.S. security and world
influence. The W estern European powers and American officials became more interested
in the situation in East Central Europe in which many perceived Romania’s importance o f
oil and grains to Germany’s potential for making war. They were concerned about that
country’s gradually falling under German influence but were not sufficiently alarmed to
take any action to stop it. Valeriu Dobrinescu opined that, “the economic depression o f
1929, the international conferences—o f world economy o f definition o f aggression and

58 Titulescu, Politica externa a Romaniei (Foreign Policy o f Romania) (Bucuresti: Editura
Enciclopedica, 1994), p. 201.
59 Quinlan, p. 23.
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aggressor, and o f disarmament,—and, most of all, the coming to power o f Nazi Party in
Germany and its revisionist policy of the Paris peace settlements, were factors that
modified radically the State Department’s view o f European affairs.60
Romania appreciated the increasing American verbal involvement in European
affairs. Referring to the declaration by Cordell Hull to the press on July 16, 1937, Victor
Antonescu, Romanian Foreign Minister, confessed to the American Minister in Romania,
Leland Harrison, that his government was pleased by “the desire for international peace
and cooperation” expressed by the United States. Antonescu also emphasized that, “the
Rumanian government had not ceased to conform its policy to the principles which Mr.
Hull had wished to reaffirm with such force and clarity.”61 This declaration by the
Romanian Foreign Minister, coming one year after the dismissal o f Nicolae Titulescu,
expressed Romania’s commitment to peace and cooperation with the West.
At the beginning o f 1938, Romania’s position in Eastern Europe was increasingly
threatened by the German march to the East. In these circumstances, Romanian officials
turned for help to the Western powers and the United States. The American Minister in
Bucharest, Franklin Gunther M ott, warned the Department o f State about the danger o f
losing Romania to Germany. Ultimately, the fall o f France, London and W ashington’s
disinterest along with other international developments led to Romania’s coming into the
German sphere o f influence in 1940.

60 Dobrinescu, p. IX.
61 FEUS, 1937, pp. 567-569.
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Chapter 2 -- Diplomatic Aspects of the Relations
Between Romania and the United States
When discussing the relations between the United States and Romania, one must
keep in mind not only that the two countries are separated by half o f the European
continent and the Atlantic Ocean, but also the asymmetrical relationship between a great
and a small power. Although both countries shared a general desire for peace in Europe,
their methods o f achieving this goal were distinct and dictated by their national interests.
In the late 1930s, the United States was isolationist and kept a cautious distance
from the turmoil in Eastern Europe. A dichotomy in American foreign policy making was
evident when President Roosevelt and his advisors disagreed with a majority in Congress
and certain isolationist circles. The Roosevelt Administration tried to raise the American
people’s awareness o f the Nazi danger for the United States’security and to gather
popular support for a stronger foreign policy. As Richard Snyder noted, “The record was
clear that Roosevelt himself regarded totalitarianism as evil, war as evil, and the former as
destined to lead to the latter in a holocaust from which the United States would not be
able to remain aloof without immeasurable sacrifice o f its principles and its interests.” 1
The President needed more than personal convictions to stimulate an active American
involvement in European affairs.

1Richard Snyder, and Edward Fumiss, American Foreign Policy: Formulation. Principles,
and Programs (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1954), p. 40. For a more recent opinion on
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s perception o f the events on Europe, see Gaddis Smith, American
Diplomacy during the Second World War. 1941-1945 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1985).
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American isolationists aimed to prevent entanglement o f the United States in
E urope’s squabbles. Through the years, they transformed isolationism from an attitude to
a psychological barrier designed to protect American citizens from war. Many Americans
believed United States participation in World W ar I had been a mistake promoted by
businessmen interested only in profits.2 The most emphatic statements o f American
isolationism were the three Neutrality Acts o f 1935, 1937, and 1939 which declared
Congress’s will to keep America out o f a future European war.3
On the other hand, Romania was diplomatically dependent upon the protection o f
the W estern powers—France, her traditional ally, and Great Britain. In the interwar
period, Romanian diplomats did not consider the United States as a potential guarantor o f
the territorial integrity o f the Romanian state. The main objective o f Romanian foreign
policy in the late 1930s was the maintenance o f the territorial “status quo” within the
context o f Romania’s deepening international isolation and the rapid modifications in the
international balance o f power in favor o f Hitler’s revisionist policy. Romanian diplomacy
tried to ward off the increasing dangers o f aggression on the part o f Nazi Germany and
Horthyst Hungary by granting more and more substantial economic concessions to the
Third Reich.

2 An eloquent example o f this opinion among Americans were the investigations o f the
Nye Committee.
3 William Langer, and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolationism: The World
Crisis o f 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy, vol. I (New York: Harper & Row,
1964), p. 204.
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Eastern Europe was still a remote region, little known in the Unites States before
W orld W ar I, despite the big number o f immigrants which came from this area at the end
o f 1800s and the beginning o f the twentieth century. American intervention in the first
world conflagration, President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and the Paris Peace Conference
brought Eastern Europe under scrutiny. American officials regarded the political turmoil
in this region as a danger to the stability o f the entire continent. During the 19th century,
the Balkans were named “Europe’s powder keg” because o f the potential o f their
nationalist conflicts eventually involving all the great powers. For this reason, before the
American entrance in the war, President Wilson and his team o f experts inclined toward
retaining the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a guarantee o f the European balance o f
power. Although the small Allied Eastern European countries triumphed in Paris, the
former Allies continued to fear the consequences o f conflict in this region.

Reflective o f W estern opinion about Eastern Europe was the chapter dedicated to
it in the prestigious publication Survey o f International Affairs, edited by Arnold Toynbee.
Eastern Europe was there perceived as a region prone to national conflict due to its
“national groupings [who] had not undergone the historical development and discipline
which in the west had produced the nationalist creed itself.”4 Social conflicts between
classes also characterized this region and were attributed to “the absence or weakness o f
an indigenous middle class, ... the retarding o f commercial development for over ten

4 Survey o f International Affairs. 1939-1946: The World in M arch 1939. ed. by Arnold
Toynbee (London: Oxford Press, 1952), pp. 212-213.
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centuries by invasion, warfare, and the deadening rule o f the Turkish Empire. . . .”5 Finally,
M artin Wright emphasized that the survival o f the new East European states depended on
the Great Powers who used them either as a barrier to German expansion eastward or as
“a cordon sanitaire or buffer zone protecting Central and W estern Europe against the
Bolshevik danger from the east.”6

Romania had become the second largest country and occupied an important
strategic place in East Central Europe after 1919.7 The Treaties o f Saint-Germain and
Trianon sanctioned the union o f Bukovina and Transylvania with the rest o f the Old
Kingdom. On November 18, 1918, the Council o f the Fatherland f Sfatul TariD o f
Bessarabia voted unanimously the return o f this region to Romania. Romanian leaders led
a vigorous campaign to justify the historical rights o f Romania to these provinces.
Nevertheless, the Western European powers and the United States thought o f the Eastern
European kingdom as an “inflated,” opportunistic country which took advantage o f its
participation in the war to aggrandize itself territorially. For example, a 1940 article in
The N ew Republic alleged that “Rumania entered the last war for what there was in it and
grabbed territory right and left while the grabbing was good.... The bribes she received in
the w ar settlement have been a sore spot in Europe ever since.”8 The assertion about “the
bribes” referred to Transylvania, which Hungary had continuously claimed since 1918, and

5 Ibid., p. 220.
6 Ibid., p. 235.
7 In 1919, Romania had a population o f 16,250,000 which grew to 19,933,802 in 1939.
The territorial gains added 156,000 square kilometers~in 1920, Romania encompassed
296,000 square kilometers. Hitchins, p. 290.
8 The N ew Republic. July 8, 1940, p. 45.
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Bessarabia, whose union with Romania was never recognized by the Soviet Union.
Because the United States did not ratify any o f the World War I treaties, it did not feel
obliged to contribute to the maintaining o f the status quo in Eastern Europe.

In the late 1930s, the situation changed when the rapid advance o f Germany in
East Central Europe alarmed American officials. One o f the interesting facts about
American isolationism was that the President and the Department o f State were constantly
and generally correctly informed about the situation in Romania and other Eastern
European countries situated in the way o f Nazi expansion. As historians William Langer
and Everett Gleason noted, “Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull were ... promptly and fully
informed. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that they were better placed than other
statesmen to see all aspects o f the situation and, if they deemed it desirable, to exercise
great influence.”9 The American Ministers to France, Belgium, Great Britain, the Soviet
Union, and Romania, as well as Pierrepont Moffat, Chief o f the European Division in the
State Department, and his team did not tire o f informing the President and the Secretary o f
State o f the worrying developments in Eastern Europe and Romania. In light o f reports
received by the State Department, the period between 1938-1940 was particularly
important for understanding the attitude o f the United States toward Romania. Valeriu
Dobrinescu pointed out that “the American Ministers accredited ih the European capitals
noticed the narrowing o f survival possibilities o f the countries o f East-Central Europe and

9 Langer and Gleason, p. 76.

35

the Balkans because o f the conciliatory policy o f the great European powers towards
Germany and the other revisionist states.” 10

The annexation o f Austria (Anschluss) and the Munich Agreement were
particularly damaging for the independence o f the countries in Eastern Europe. Paul
Quinlan concluded that “with the Anschluss, French hegemony over South Eastern
Europe ended. The old balance o f power was replaced by an unstable equilibrium
between three pow er groups: France-Great Britain, Germany-Italy, and Soviet Russia.” 11
Romania occupied a precarious position between Germany and Russia. French historian
Henri Prost commented on Romania’s precarious strategic position which placed her
between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, “two colossuses whose military power
grew day by day and whose appetites would change the 1919 European status quo.” 12
The Anschluss brought Germany on to the Danube and put her in the position to control
the commercial traffic on part o f the river. This situation, in turn, threatened the economic
independence o f the riverane countries, among them Romania whose rich oil and grain
resources attracted the Third Reich’s economic strategists. American officials
acknowledged Germany’s appetite for the resources o f Romania. In August 1938, G. S.
Messerschmidt, the U.S. Assistant Secretary o f State, estimated that Hitler’s domination

10 Valeriu Dobrinescu, Emieratia romana in lumea anglo-saxona. 1939-1945 (Romanian
Immigration in the Anglo-Saxon World) ( Iasi: Institutul European, 1993), p. 119.
11 Quinlan, p. 32.
12 Henri Prost, Destin de la Roumanie. 1918-1954 (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault,
1954), p. 112.
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o f Austria and Czechoslovakia was intended to clear the way to the Romanian oil without
which Germany could not pursue w ar.13

Tension over Czechoslovakia’s fate brought into light Romania’s situation.
Romania, together with Yugoslavia, was allied with Czechoslovakia through the Little
Entente. The three countries expended a lot o f effort in consolidating this regional alliance
after 1933 which was directed against Hungarian revisionism. The Little Entente did not
become, in spite o f the efforts and hopes o f its participants, a powerful instrument o f
protection for the three countries.14 As Marvin Wright acknowledged, “Eastern European
politics were haunted by the longing for collective independence in international affairs,
and by the fancy o f political self-sufficiency.... The illusion was always pursued, and never
attained, that there might be built up in Eastern Europe an autonomous third force, a
neutral bloc that would itself have the defensive weight o f a Great Pow er.” 15

In 1938, after the Munich crisis, Romania was ready to fulfill her duties in the
Little Entente. In the gamble o f defending Czechoslovakia, Romania played an important
part not only because o f her membership in the regional alliance but also because o f the
way the alliance system was established in the East Central Europe. Czechoslovak
security rested on tw o treaties o f 1935, the Franco-Czechoslovak and the Soviet -

13 FRUS, 1938, vol. I, p. 68.
14 For more information about the activities and failures o f the Little Entente, see Eliza
Campus, Mica Inteleeere (Little Entente) (Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica, 1968); Robert
M achray, The Struggle for the Danube and the Little Entente. 1929-1938 (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1938).
15 Survey o f International Affairs, p. 235.
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Czechoslovak, which implied a coordinated military intervention by France and the Soviet
Union. Romania and Poland were asked in 1938 and again, at the beginning o f 1939, by
George Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, if they would agree to let the Soviet troops
and planes cross their national territories to help Czechoslovakia.16 The American
Minister to France, William Bullitt, announced to the Department o f State that Poland
“would declare war immediately on the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union should attempt
to send troops across Polish territory to„ support Czechoslovakia.” 17 Concomitently, the
Polish Ambassador to France, Juliusz Lukasiewicz, declared that “he was certain that the
Rumanian government would declare war simultaneously on the Soviet Union in
accordance with the Polish-Rumanian alliance.” 18

There was no question o f an unfriendly attitude toward Czechoslovakia on the part
o f Romania. For example, Romanian military historian loan Talpes used documents from
the Archives o f the Romanian Ministry o f National Defense to prove that the planes
bought by Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union flew over Romania by governmental
agreem ent.19 An explanation for Romania’s reluctance to allow the Soviet troops and
planes to cross its territory lay in the U .S.S.R.’s obstinate refusal to recognize formally the

16 loan Talpes, Diplomatie si aparare. 1933-1939 (Diplomacy and Defense) (Bucuresti:
Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1988), p. 220. For more information, see Documents
Diplomatiques Francais> 1932-1939. Vol. 10 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1970).
17 FRUS. 1938, vol. I, p. 507.
18 Ibid. See also Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Diplomat in Paris. 1936-1939: Papers and Memoirs
o f Juliusz Lukasiewicz. Ambassador o f Poland (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970).
19 “From June 15 until July 27, 1938, forty bombers flew from Romania to
Czechoslovakia.” Talpes, p. 221-222.
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union o f Bessarabia with Romania. Another reason why Romania did not want to be
involved in a formal commitment toward the Soviet Union was fear o f Germany. As
Grigore Gafencu remarked in his conversation with William Bullitt in April 1939,
“Rumania would be most embarrassed if either England or France should make pacts with
the Soviet Union guaranteeing Rumania against attacks as such parts might be in
themselves sufficient to provoke Hitler to attack Rumania.”20 W estern politicians found it
difficult to understand the fear o f Romania towards its Soviet neighbor. M oreover, they
regarded the Soviet Union as a possible ally against the German “Drang nach Osten” and
did not want to endanger a future alliance with the Soviet Union for the sake o f
Romania.21

Romanian officials became worried about the dissolving o f their allies. After
Munich, the Romanian Military Headquarters commented on France’s and Great Britain’s
appeasement diplomacy at Munich and concluded that the recent events proved the
weakness o f Romania’s alliance with the two Western European powers. M oreover, the
analysts o f the Romanian Military Headquarters warned against the impossibility o f the
Little Entente to be effective in stopping the Nazi march to the East.22 King Carol II o f
Romania and his advising team reached at Romania’s neighbors and allies to find help, but

20 FRUS. 1939, vol. I, pp. 90-92.
21 In O ctober 1939, Franklin Gunther M ott wrote in one o f his telegrams to the State
Departm ent that he heard both the Turkish and the British Ministers to Romania “advise a
member o f the Rumanian Government to put up a stiff resistance to any Russian demands
which may be forthcoming. When asked what kind o f assistance would be extended by
their respective countries they replied evasively.” (N.A., 871.24/181)
22 Talpes, p. 252.

they were disappointed. Poland had a non-aggression pact with Germany.
Czechoslovakia was half dead. Yugoslavia had a treaty o f friendship and neutrality with
Italy and had important economic and commercial relations with Germany. The only hope
remained the invitations to visit England, already postponed twice, in January and May
1938. In November 1938, King Carol II’s diplomatic journey to England, France, and
Germany was the cry for help from a Romania suffocated by the Reich’s economic
pressures. Before the visit, Romanian officials had received assurances o f sympathy from
London and Paris; they went personally to assess the degree o f interest o f France and
Great Britain in protecting Romania. No documents attest to the attitude o f American
officials tow ard this royal visit but it is known that Franklin Gunther M ott, the American
Minister in Romania, informed Washington about the efforts o f Sir Reginald Hoare, the
British Minister, to raise England’s interest in Romania: “If Great Britain is ever serious
to attempt to stem the German Drang nach Osten, a strong Romania in which Great
Britain has a vital interest would be a serious stumbling block in the path o f Mr. Hitler.”23

The results o f the royal visit gave little comfort to the Romanian side. Although
the king was well-received in London and Paris, his requests for economic assistance did
not generate direct help from the Western powers. As A.L. Easterman, Foreign
Correspondent for Daily Herald commented, despite England’s sympathetic signs, “in
1939, Romania was still, in British eyes, a distant and comparatively unimportant Balkan

23 FRU S. 1939, vol. I, p. 386. For the Great Britain’s strategy on Romania, see David
Funderbunk, Politica Marii Britanii fata the Romania. 1938-1940: Studiu asupra strateeiei
economice si politice (Great Britain’s Policy toward Romania: A Study in Economic and
Political Strategy) (Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1983).
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state.”24 Carol did not have much luck at Berlin either. Hitler did not want to give
Romania any guarantees against a possible Hungarian or Soviet attack. In turn, the
Reich’s leader threatened Carol with more pressure if his economic demands were not
satisfied.25

No documents clearly indicate the position o f the United States toward the British
involvement in Romania. Probably, the State Department officials felt part o f the
assistance process by supporting the English efforts to strengthen the relations with
Romania. Paul Quinlan suggested that “the United States ... encouraged Britain not to
abandon Romania. [Ambassador Joseph] Kennedy said to Halifax that America would be
‘more readily moved’ to support Britain if she aided Romania, than if she did nothing. If,
having abandoned Romania, England became involved in a conflict with Germany in
defending Greece or Turkey, America might not come to her aid.”26 Also, in September
1938, William Culbertson, the former American Minister to Bucharest in the 1920s,
visited Romania to promote economic and financial relations between the two countries.
Upon his return, he made a broadcast on national radio (September 28, 1938) about the
results o f his Eastern European trip. Culbertson underlined the dangerous consequences
o f the Munich Agreement for the countries in this region. The former American Minister
remarked Romania’s desire to preserve its independence and national frontiers: “In

24 A.L. Easterman, King Carol. Hitler, and Lupescu (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd.,
1942), p. 168.
25 For an account o f King Carol’s visit at Berlin and Hitler’s demands, see Documents on
German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945), Volume 6 (Washington,D C. :
Government Printing Office, 1957).
26 Quinlan, p. 43.
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Romania, the King, with whom I talked at some length, was determined to maintain the
independence o f his country from outside control and to advance its moral and material
development.”27

The year 1939 brought more challenges and anxieties to Romania and drew the
attention o f the State Department to this country. One event which deeply affected
Romania was the Nazi occupation o f Bohemia and Moravia in M arch 1939.
Czechoslovakia had been Romania’s most reliable armament contractor with almost 70
per cent o f Romania’s arms contracts from 1919 to 1939.28 According to historians Gh.
Zaharia and I. Calafeteanu, Czechoslovakia honored most o f its contracts before the
German occupation. In August 1939, the Romanian infantry had 300,000 “ZB” rifles;
20,177 “ZB” sub-machine guns; 3500 “ZB” machine-guns. The artillery received 248
100-mm “Skoda” shell-machines and 180 150-mm “Skoda” shell-machines, all from the
1937 production.29

Also in M arch 1939 occurred the famous episode o f the intervention at the British
Foreign Office by Viorel V. Tilea, Romanian Minister in London.30 While in Bucharest, a
German delegation, led by Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat, was pressuring the Romanian
government to accept Germany’s economic demands. On M arch 17, V.V. Tilea had

27 Dobrinescu, Romania si Statele Unite ale Americii. pp. LXVIII and LXX.
28 Talpes, p. 268.
29 Gheorghe Zaharia and Ion Calafeteanu, Politica de aparare nationala a Romaniei in
contextul european interbelic. 1919-1939 (The National Defense Policy o f Romania in the
Interw ar Period, 1919-1939) (Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1981), p.
319.
30 For details, see Funderbunk, pp. 95-103.

42

declared to the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, that the Third Reich had given to
Romania an economic ultimatum. Tilea stopped at the American Embassy on his way to
the Foreign Office in London.31 Therefore, the United States officials were fully and
immediately informed o f the alleged ultimatum. Tilea’s intervention alarmed other
American diplomatic officers who tried to get as many details as they could about the truth
o f his assertions. William Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, and Edwin Wilson,
Counselor o f Embassy, discussed with the French Minister o f Foreign Affairs, George
Bonnet, and the Romanian Ambassador in Paris, former Prime Minister Gheorghe
Tatarescu, what would happen in case Germany had really delivered an ultimatum. They
concluded that Germany’s economic demands on Romania had taken “the form o f a
virtual ultimatum.”32 Bullitt related that the Romanian Ambassador in Paris confessed to
him that

what Germany had demanded was all the grain o f Rumania for four years
and all her oil production, the turning over to Germany o f plants connected
with the oil production which were now in the hands o f foreigners, some o f
them Americans, and the right to Germany to develop and exploit new oil
fields in Rumania without the Rumanian Government having any control
over the German development and exploitation o f those.33
The American Ambassador asked Gheorghe Tatarescu what Romania thought about
Soviet assistance. From his reply, Bullitt concluded that neither Romania nor Poland
“would dare to make a deal with the Soviet Union for fear o f too greatly offending

31 Dobrinescu, Romanian Immigration, p. 120.
32 FRU S. 1 9 3 9 ,1, p. 79.
33 Ibid.
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Germany; but both countries in case o f necessity would welcome the Soviet Union’s
aid.”34

As an immediate consequence o f Tilea’s intervention, the British government made
inquiries o f the governments o f Romania, Greece, Poland, Yugoslavia, France, the Soviet
Union, and Turkey about their positions regarding cooperation in case o f a future attack
on Romania or other Eastern European countries. The Department o f State received a
detailed telegram from Joseph Kennedy, the American Ambassador in England,
summarizing these countries’answers to the British inquiry. Greece stated it would
consult with Turkey and Yugoslavia whether or not to help Romania in case o f a German
attack. Turkey declared that, although it did not receive any communication from
Bucharest, would fulfill its Balkans Entente obligations. Yugoslavia replied that it would
opt for neutrality in case o f a conflict because o f Italy’s involvement with Germany. The
Polish Foreign Minister, Joseph Beck, doubted that Germany had sent such an ultimatum
to Romania. The Soviet Union proposed a conference among the six most interested
countries, namely Great Britain, France, Poland, Greece, Turkey, Romania, and the
U.S.S.R. to discuss the position o f all participants.35 France declared itself prepared to
participate in a joint defensive action and underlined the importance o f W estern help
tow ard Romania. Finally, Romania expressed its reluctance to participate eventually in
any mutual assistance pact due to the fear o f an immediate German attack. Although the

34 Ibid.
35 See also the memorandum o f the Chief o f the Division o f European Affairs, Pierrepont
M offat, M arch 21, 1939, FRUS. 1939,1, p. 73.
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Romanian government denied the existence o f a German ultimatum, most historians
agreed that Tilea’s intervention was instrumental in Great Britain’s decision to give
unilateral guarantees to Poland, and later, Romania and Greece on April 13, 1939.
Ambassador Joseph Kennedy noted that “the Rumanian demarche had at least served the
useful purpose o f galvanizing the Western democratic powers into immediate examination
o f the new situation and the dangers it presented.”36

The international isolation o f Romania forced its officials to sign the economic
agreement with Germany on March 22, 1939.37 King Carol’s decision to grant economic
concessions to Hitler must be connected to the international developments in East-Central
Europe at the time--the disappearance o f Czechoslovakia as an independent country, the
building Polish corridor crisis, and the formation o f the “independent” Slovak state—as
well as with his desire to keep the Reich away from Romania’s borders through economic
concessions. Nevertheless, the King realized, as Easterman noted, that the treaty “meant a
victory for Hitler; it was the first Roumanian slide-slip into the grip o f Nazi Germany. He
realized something more—that the ratification, with the sterile results o f the British
Guarantee, had weakened his position abroad and diminished his authority in his country.
His obviously pro-British—and pro-French—policy had suffered a severe setback.”38 In
this period, Romanian diplomacy had one goal, to maintain friendly relations with

36 FRU S. I, 1939, p. 92.
37 For details on the Romanian-German economic agreement o f 1939 and its background,
see A. Niri, Istoricul unui tratat inrobitor (The History o f an Enslaving Treaty) (Bucuresti:
Editura Stiintifica, 1965) and Andreas Hillgruber, Relatiile romano-germane. 1938-1944
(Romanian-German Relations, 1938-1944) (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 1994).
38 Easterman, p. 181.
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Germany through economic concessions. For example, in 1939, over half o f Romania’s
trade was with Germany, the new source o f most Romanian war material.39 The country
was in an awkward position, as synthesized by Grigore Gafencu: “Guaranteed by London
and armed by Berlin, Rumania was in a situation in which anything might happen.”40

In this tense international atmosphere, President Roosevelt sent his peace telegram
to Hitler on April 14, 1939.41 His gesture could be attributed to the increasing American
anxiety about the fate o f Europe, particularly its East Central part.42 The President called
on Mussolini and Hitler to agree on a ten or twenty-five year non-aggression agreement
and to express openly their future intentions. Roosevelt also asked the two dictators not
to aggress thirty-one states—one o f which was Romania. Hitler reacted vigorously on
April 17 by asking all states mentioned by President Roosevelt if any o f them feared
Germany. Hitler questioned Romania if she provoked the U.S. intervention, and if she felt
threatened by Germany.43 To such direct questions, Romania could answer only in the
negative. At the same time, to demonstrate their pro-W estern attitude, Armand Calinescu,

39 Quinlan, p. 60. See also Hillgruber, p. 79.
40 Grigore Gafencu, Last Davs o f Europe: A Diplomatic Joumev in 1939 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1958), p. 129.
41 For the entire content o f the telegram, see Peace and W ar . United States Foreign
Policy. 1931-1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 455-458.
42 As notable coincidences with this unprecedented event, one must notice the visit o f the
American Ambassador to London, Kennedy, to the British Prime-Minister, Neville
Chamberlain. Also, in the same o f the speech, Romanian Foreign Minister, Grigore
Gafencu, started its European diplomatic tour.
43 Dobrinescu, Romanian Immigration, p. 123.
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Romania’s Prime-Minister, and King Carol II received visits from American officials to
Bucharest and asked them if the United States would sell them arms on credit.44

Another important event for Romanian diplomacy was the visit o f Foreign
Minister, Grigore Gafencu, to London, Paris, and Berlin where he met with the American
diplomats William Bullitt, American Ambassador in Paris, Joseph Kennedy, American
Ambassador in London, and Joseph Davies, American Ambassador in Brussels.45 In his
account o f the conversations with Gafencu, Bullitt said that the Romanian Foreign
Minister asked him if he thought Rumania could obtain airplanes, anti-aircraft guns, and
anti-tank guns in the United States and instructed Gh. Tatarescu, Romanian Minister in
Paris, to give Bullitt a list o f things Romania needed from the United States. Gafencu also
explored possibilities o f increasing the trade between Romania and the United States but
he did not get a clear answer from the American Ambassador.46 Given the reluctance o f
France and Britain to help Romania, Bullitt warned the State Department that that country
would make “friendship acts, particularly economic, towards Hitler.”47 Valeriu
Dobrinescu opined that, in the summer o f 1939, the U.S. Department o f State had become
very preoccupied with the international situation o f Romania. As result, on June 6, Radu

44 King Carol II, Intre datorii si pasiune: Insemnari zilnice (Between Duties and Passion:
Daily N otes) (Bucuresti: Editura Silex, 1995), p. 105.
45 Grigore Gafencu, Last Days o f Europe: A Diplomatic Joumev in 1939.
46 FRUS. 1939, I, p. 176.
47 Ibid., p. 175.
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Irimescu, the Romanian Minister in Washington, was called to the White House and
received Roosevelt’s promise that he would ask the king o f England to help Romania.48

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact o f August 23, 1939, surprised and troubled the
United States and the W estern European powers, especially because it ended the latter’s
efforts to bring the Union o f Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.) into an alliance against
Germany. Paul Quinlan concluded that this “pact not only wrecked Britain’s attempts to
extend her alliance system, but also made World War II almost inevitable. At the same
time, it had grave consequences on Romania.”49 American and European diplomacy did
not know about the existence o f the secret protocols o f the M olotov-Ribbentrop Pact by
which Germany expressed its disinterest in Bessarabia, but understood that the conciliation
o f the tw o powers meant a higher risk o f attack for Romania.

The W ashington authorities were informed promptly about the turn o f the events.
Joseph Davies described the Pact in his report to the White House as a “calamity” and
“one o f the greatest diplomatic defeats the British Empire ever sustained,” and pointed out
the U .S.S.R .’s importance as “a source o f food and supplies to Germany.”50 Davies
observed the impact o f the Russian-German agreement on the Balkan states. He believed
that Hitler gained time to render solid his acquisitions in East Central Europe and to

48 Dobrinescu, Romanian Immigration, p. 125.
49 Quinlan, p. 47.
50FRUS, 1 9 3 9 ,1, p. 189.
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organize the resources o f the Balkans while benefiting, even for a short time, o f the
industrial and material resources of the Soviet Union.”51

Franklin Gunther M ott told the State Department o f the anxiety o f Romanian
officials about the Pact and Carol’s pessimism:

The king was not surprised by Germany’s non-aggression pact with Russia
nor does he feels that it alters the situation particularly. Hitler ... will make
the most o f it internally and o f the commercial pact but that his principal
motive therein for the present was to eliminate one potential enemy. He
observed that Western leaders must have been credulous indeed if they
really thought that they could succeed in getting Russia to fight for them.52
Valeriu Dobrinescu asserted that the two events, the failure o f the Russian-English-French
negotiations and the Russian-German Pact, radically changed the military and political
situation o f Romania and narrowed her room for maneuver. “The entire juridical basis o f
Romanian-Soviet relations was annulled.”53 Therefore, Romania started to seriously
consider Germany as a protector against a potential Soviet attack.54

After September 1939, Romanian officials looked more toward the United States
for help and material support. Franklin Gunther M ott continued to inform Washington
about Romania’s situation and warned his superiors about Romania’s going over to the
German side. He did not question the country’s decision to preserve its boundaries or
independence in case o f an individual attack from Russia or Germany, or a conjugated

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 371.
53 Dobrinescu, Romania and the United States, p. LXXVI.
54 Romanian diplomacy did not know about the secret protocols but King Carol II and his
advisors feared continuously o f a Soviet attack on Romania.
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action o f the two. On September 19, 1939, Armand Calinescu told M ott emphatically
“that Great Britain and France alone and unaided were in no position to offer
resistance.”55 The Romanian Prime Minister opined that “America could play a decisive
role by the wholesale furnishing o f arms and munitions” because Romania was “in a
strategic position to offer effective resistance if properly armed.”56

Romania appreciated President Roosevelt’s drive for peace and his offers to
mediate between Germany and the other belligerents. Therefore, Romanian diplomats
kept in contact with the American Minister in Bucharest about any peace proposals
coming from Washington. On October 2, 1939, Gunther informed the Secretary o f State
that Gafencu inquired if “a[ny] peace initiative by President Roosevelt was under
contemplation.” 57 The Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs confessed his conviction
that only President Roosevelt’s intervention could help the peace movement. He added
that, were peace to end, “the outlook was indeed dark for Rumania, for either the Allies
were victorious, in which case Rumania would have no protection against Russia, or
Germany would win, in which case Rumania would forcibly become its vassal.”58 Two
days later, Constantin Argentoianu, short-term Prime Minister o f Romania after the
assassination o f Armand Calinescu, made the same inquiry to Gunther M ott. A proposal
by Franz von Papen, German Ambassador in Turkey, for a united peace movement o f
European neutral states prompted Gafencu and Argentoianu to inquire about the United

55 FRUS. 1 9 3 9 ,1, p. 442.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 499.
58 Ibid.
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States’ opinion o f the German approach. The American Minister concluded that
Romanian government thought that only the United States could convince Great Britain to
help the neutral European states.59

The biggest tension in Romanian-American relations between 1938 and 1940
developed over the problem o f Polish refugees. Well-known is the fact that on September
17, 1939, Romania, a neutral country, offered asylum or transit to Polish officials, civilians
and troops. Gunther’s telegrams expressed the fact that Romania dealt with a situation
without precedent in international law, except for the refuge taken by Haile Selassie I,
Em peror o f Ethiopia, and his Court after the Italian invasion o f his country. The only
condition demanded by Romania from the Polish leaders was they would not conduct
propaganda on Romanian territory and that they would enter as private citizens. The
request seemed reasonable considering the possible danger o f immediate German
intervention. Both Bullitt and Gunther immediately informed the State Department about
the seriousness o f the German threats against Romania: “Berlin had warned Bucharest to
the effect that Berlin would not countenance Bucharest’s (a) permitting officials o f the
Polish Government to function or (b) permitting officials or Polish refugees o f military age
to leave Rumania.”60

While on Romanian soil, the former Polish leaders declared that the Poles would
continue to fight from exile. Therefore, Romanian officials decided to intern them out o f

59 Ibid., p. 501.
60 FRUS. 1939, II, p. 689. See, also, Ambassador’s Bullitt telegram from September 26,
1939.)
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fear o f a German attack on Romania. Immediately, France and England directly pressured
Bucharest to release the former Polish leaders and indirectly brought pressure to bear from
the United States. The American government did not decide to get involved until late
September and kept its intervention strictly private.61 Cordell Hull advised Minister
Gunther to approach the Romanian officials “in a purely personal way.”62 Also, the
American President sent a personal message to King Carol about the United States’
intention to invite ex-President Moscicki o f Poland for a visit, even though he had
expressed a desire to seek asylum in Switzerland. Roosevelt suggested that Gunther
should present to the Romanian sovereign with “a verbal message, ... without anything in
writing or without an aide-memoire. This could be done without any publicity
whatsoever.”63

Unfortunately, the State Department, in replying to M ott, did not address to
Germany’s reaction to Romania’s facilitating Moscicki’s visit to the United States.
Franklin Gunther M ott asked the Department o f State if “President M oscicki’s liberation
would result in punitive action by Germany and/or Russia” and in either event whether or
not it was “prepared to do at least as much as you did for Finland.”64 His inquiry received
no answer, although earlier the American Minister informed his superiors about the
external and internal danger faced by Romania those days. Partly due to G unther’s

61 Paul Quinlan believed that the President was pressured by Bullitt and Biddle, the
American Ambassador to Poland, to intervene on behalf o f the Polish official refugees.
62 Ibid., p. 693. See also Hull, pp. 686-687.
63 Ibid., p. 701.
64 Ibid.

diligent efforts, the ex-Polish President left Romania on December 25, 1939, followed by
other officials. Only former Polish Prime-Minister, Josef Beck, already tired and sick, died
in Romania in 1944.

Romania was worried not only about the German invasion o f Poland, but also
about the Soviet occupation o f the Subcarpathian Ukraine on September 17th. The
American Ambassador in Italy, Phillips, was quick to inform the Secretary o f State that
Romania would be “the first to feel the shock o f the oncoming Russians.”65 Gunther
expressed the same fears from Bucharest regarding Romanian concern tow ard the future
intentions o f the Soviet Union. There was “considerable anxiety in Government circles
concerning the future intentions o f Russia.... Even should peace come it would hardly
relieve Rumania from the potential danger o f Russia in its new geographic position o f
advantage.”66 Gunther also observed how, momentarily, Romanian fears shifted from
Germany to the Soviet Union: “It was my belief that Russia presented a much greater
danger to this part o f the world than did Germany.”67 Gunther underlined the fragility o f
the English guarantees granted to Romania on April 13, 1939 and pointed out the fact that
Great Britain would not go to war with the Soviet Union for Romania. The British
guarantee o f April 1939 referred exclusively to a German aggression.68

65 FRUS. 1 9 3 9 ,1, p. 502.
66 Ibid., p. 499.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid. The new direction in Romanian diplomatic history emphasized the lack o f practical
value o f the British and French guarantees and that their intentions o f helping Romania did
not go beyond the letter o f the treaties. See Viorica Moisuc, Premisele isolarii politice a
Romaniei (Premises o f Romania’s Political Isolation) (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 1991).
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The Department o f State received more information not only from Bucharest, but
also from M oscow about Romanian isolation in the event o f a Soviet attack. The
American Ambassador in Moscow, Lawrence Steinhardt, confirmed G unther’s fears. In a
conversation there with the Italian Ambassador, he discovered that Italy would not object
or intervene if the Soviets should limit their violent action to Bessarabia. Eventually, Italy
would be interested in a pact with Turkey, France, and Britain, to stop a further Russian
aggression in the Balkans.69 Italy was vitally interested in the future o f Albania and
Greece. As long as Russia did not exhibit any particular interest in this part o f the
Balkans, Italian officials were willing to make no intervention on behalf o f Romania.

It is fair to say that the American officials received information about the
possibility o f Soviet aggression against Romania, starting in the fall o f 1939. In October
1939, the Department o f State received from M oscow a report that the Soviet Union was
inquiring o f Romania’s allies about their policies in case it attacked Romania. The
dispatch mentioned the Turkish-Russian negotiations for a non-aggression pact which
brought to light the question o f Romania: “The question o f Romania had also been
subsequently raised by the Soviet Government with the object o f obtaining assurances o f
Turkish neutrality not only in the event o f the Soviet seizure o f Bessarabia but also in the
event o f a Bulgarian attempt to acquire the Dobrudja.”70 Grigore Gafencu had many
hopes that the Turkish-Soviet negotiations would ease Romania’s way to signing a non

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 484.

aggression pact with the U.S.S.R.71 He knew that Turkey was obliged to intervene in
Rom ania’s defense-according to the Balkan Entente—only in case o f a conflict among the
Balkan states. Romania kept constantly in touch with American diplomats in hope that
they would persuade the Soviet Union not to attack Romania. The only official U.S.
request was expressed by Ambassador Steinhardt at the beginning o f 1940. He
communicated to Viaceslav Molotov, the Soviet Minister o f Foreign Affairs, that
Washington hoped that the Soviet government “would not formulate demands
incompatible with the independence and sovereignty o f Rumania.”72 In early 1940,
Gafencu was ready to negotiate a solution with the Soviet Union to ease the tension
between the tw o countries. He asked the United States, through Gunther, if it could
obtain “a clarification o f Russian intentions.”73 The State Department reaffirmed its
neutral position so long as the interests o f American citizens were not affected: “It would
be inopportune and would serve no useful purpose for the American Embassy in M oscow
to take steps along the lines suggested.”74

Isolated and scared, King Carol II turned completely to Germany in June 1940.
He named Ion Gigurtu, a pro-German businessman, as Foreign Minister in June 1940,
later Prime Minister. At the beginning o f July, Romania withdrew from the League o f

71 Grigore Gafencu wrote in his memoirs: “To clarify the Soviet Union’s intentions toward
us, w e counted on Saracioglu’s negotiations in Moscow. The Turkish Foreign Minister
who negotiated an assistance pact with the Russians, could obtain, maybe, a status quo in
the Balkans.” Grigore Gafencu, Note politice. 1929-1939 (Political Notes, 1929-1939)
(Bucuresti. Humanitas, 1992)* p. 342,
72 Dobrinescu, Romanian Immigration, p. 127.
73 FRUS, 1 9 4 0 ,1, p. 468.
74 Ibid.
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Nations and renounced the British-French guarantees. A.L. Easterman justified King
C arol’s radical change o f policy:

Both the enemies and friends o f Carol saw only one way out o f the critical
situation which faced Rumania—to make the best o f a perilous situation by
accepting the fact o f Hitler’s triumphant mastery o f the European continent
and to integrate Rumania within that actuality. There seemed no other way
to save Rumania, no other hope o f extricating from the ruins o f W estern
Europe some resemblance o f national existence than by seeking the
tolerance, if not the goodwill, of the Nazi Fuhrer.75
The international isolation o f Romania increased in the summer o f 1940. The fall
o f France in June 1940 ended Romania’s system o f alliances based on France’s military
strength. Franklin Gunther informed the State Department about Romania’s territorial
losses o f June 26, August 30, and September 4.76 Starting with late May 1940,
Washington was overwhelmed with messages from M oscow and Bucharest about a
massive concentration o f Soviet troops at the Romanian border. In a telegram dated May
29, 1940, Cordell Hull asked Walter Thurston, American Charge d ’Affairs in Russia, to
check information received by the State Department about “an intensive military activity
along the Rumanian frontier in the Soviet Union, the very active construction o f roads and
rail facilities in Russian-occupied land and the removal o f peasant population from the
frontier districts in the Union. Romanians were fearful o f a Soviet military invasion.”77
Hull encouraged Thurston to express to the Soviet authorities the American concern about

75 Easterman, p. 206.
76 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union presented Romania with an ultimatum asking for
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. On September 1940, through the Dictate o f Vienna,
Romania lost most o f Transylvania. Finally, as result o f the Craiova negotiations,
Romania ceded to Bulgaria the southern part o f Dobrudja.
77 FRUS, 1 9 4 0 ,1, p. 469.
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“reports ... o f the possibility o f the extension o f war in the Balkans.”78 The sudden fall o f
France and the victorious march o f the German army to the English Channel alarmed not
only England but also the United States and the Soviet Union, the latter having counted on
a long war between the “imperialist” powers. Therefore, the telegrams received by the
State Department in the summer o f 1940 indicated that the American Ambassadors to
Moscow, Ankara, and Bucharest had seen the Soviet attack on Romania as a defensive
measure designed to strengthen the southern and western borders o f the U.S. S. R .79

The State D epartm ent’s opinion o f the Transylvanian problem, and ultimately, o f
the Diktat o f Vienna, was shaped by the analyses and reports o f the American Ministers to
Bucharest and Budapest.80 They recognized that tension between Hungary and Romania
had amplified in the summer o f 1940 and reported on possible negotiations between the
tw o countries to settle the Hungarian claims to Transylvania. In July 1940, the American
Military Attache to Bucharest, M ajor John Ratay, concisely evaluated the internal situation
and the foreign policy o f Romania. He alerted the American officials in Washington to
Hungary’s taking advantage o f the precarious situation o f Romania after the seizure o f
Bessarabia and N orthern Bukovina to pressure the Romanian government to reach an

78 Ibid. Thurston’s answer revealed a vague possibility o f a Russian attack over
Bessarabia, but considered the Soviet Union in a defensive position: “ ... Should
conditions appeared propitious (as the result o f general hostilities in the Balkans or
otherwise) it was to be assumed that the Soviet Government would seize the opportunity
to recover Bessarabia.” FRUS. 1 940,1, p. 471.
79 See FRUS. 1 9 40,1, pp. 470-479.
80 For more information, see Nicolae Dascalu, “Dictatul de la Viena in viziune americana”
(The American Perspective on the Diktat o f Vienna), in Relatii romano-americane in
timpurile modeme. pp. 231-250.
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agreement in the Transylvanian problem. Ratay opined that there was not much chance of
a negotiable solution due to the inflexibility and offensive attitude adopted by the
Hungarian delegation.81 On July 26, 1940, it became obvious that the discussions between
the tw o countries would not resolve anything. Therefore, Hitler decided to intervene and
on August 30, Germany and Italy arbitrated the conflict between Romania and Hungary.82
Romania lost a good part o f Transylvania, but Germany guaranteed the rest o f the
Romanian frontiers.

The State Department expressed its regret concerning Romania’s

desperate situation. On January 15, 1941, Cordell Hull presented to the House o f
Representatives a report on the international situation in which he deplored the
dismemberment o f Romania and its occupation by the Germans.83

The foreign policy assumptions and goals o f Romanian diplomacy during 1938 to
1940 were not shared by the extreme right wing parties.

For example, according to

Mihail Sturdza,84 the United States had a large responsibility for abandoning the fate o f
Europe in the hands o f the Soviet Union. By not participating in the League o f Nations,
the American diplomacy left the debate arena to diplomats like Nicolae Titulescu

81 In a later report, Ratay blamed Russia for forcing the issue o f Romanian frontiers by
acquiring Bessarabia. Once the first move to revise the borders was made, Hungary took
advantage o f the situation. The American attache defended Romania’s decision to cede
without a fight Transylvania because otherwise she was threatened either by a German or
a Soviet attack.
82 German historian A. Hillgruber opined that Hitler arbitrated between the tw o countries
because he was afraid o f a Soviet intervention. Hillgruber, p. 235.
83 Dascalu, p. 240.
84 Mihail Sturdza was counselor o f the Romanian Legation in Washington between 19271930, as well as Foreign Minister o f Romania during the short-term joint Antonescu-Iron
Guard government (September 1940-January 1941).

(Romania) and Edvard Benes (Czechoslovakia) who were “advocates” o f Russia. Sturdza
blamed Titulescu for influencing the Romanian officials in their decision to stop the
payment o f Romania’s debts to the United States because he would not forget the cold
reception he received on his 1926 American visit.*5 One must note that the Romanian
right wing exercised no control on the Romanian foreign policy making and remained
peripheral to any decisions until the Iron Guard-Antonescu regime was established in
September 1940.

During the period 1938 to 1940, the relations between Romania and the United
States developed in a context o f high and growing international tension. The two
countries closely followed events in Europe and worked for peace. They disagreed with
the W estern pow ers’ appeasement policy at Munich and on the German occupation o f
Austria, Bohemia and Moravia. Nevertheless, in spite o f Romania’s demands for a more
assertive involvement o f the United States in the problems o f East Central Europe,
officials in Washington opted for a watchful and cautious attitude. Although the American
Minister to Bucharest warned the State Department about the danger o f losing Romania
to Germany, American diplomacy reacted slowly and thus indirectly contributed to the
surrender o f Romania to the German sphere o f influence.

85 See Mihail Sturdza, Romania si sfirsitul Europei (Romania and the End o f Europe)
(Alba Iulia: Fronde, 1994), pp. 63 and 80.
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Chapter 3—Economic and Financial Relations Between Romania and the
United States
Between 1938 and 1940, the economic and financial relations between Romania
and the United States were dominated by issues unsolved in the previous years, such as
Rom ania’s debts and her government’s tight control o f all hard currencies used in foreign
trade. These problems rendered the U.S. State Department and private American firms
reluctant to provide Romania with armaments and credits despite their having received
warnings from the American Legation in Bucharest that Germany was pressing its way
into the Romanian economy by stimulating the latter’s interest in a barter agreement.
Also, American exports, especially o f motion pictures, encountered difficulties in
penetrating the Romanian market.
The economic systems o f the two countries in the interwar period functioned very
differently at times.

The United States favored trade based on immediate payments in

hard currency. On the other hand, Romania preferred clearing and barter on imports and
exports because o f its permanent lack o f hard currency. M oreover, since 1932, the state
tried to monopolize through the National Bank o f Romania most o f hard currency
transactions resulted from foreign trade. This particular situation obliged all exporting
firms, including American ones, to depend upon import authorizations and foreign
currency quotas granted by the Ministry o f Industry and Commerce. By practicing such a
policy, common in East Central and Eastern Europe at that time, the Romanian

60

government tried to protect its hard currency reserves and keep the national currency
relatively stable. Furthermore, Romania had few exports o f any interest to Americans.1
Officials in Washington wanted to be as well informed as possible about Romania’s
powers o f resistance to German economic pressure without taking any particular measures
to offer Romania an alternative. American Minister in Bucharest, Franklin Gunther M ott,
reported that the British government had established at Munich not only the
dismemberment o f Czechoslovakia but also acquiesced to German economic expansion in
Eastern Europe and was not willing to invest enough in Romania to try to stop the
German eastward expansion. He anticipated Romania’s economic agreement with
Germany in M arch 1939 when writing to the State Department in December 1938. “It
would not surprise me if there were soon some sledge hammering in the German trade and
barter negotiations going on with Rumania.”2 Gunther observed that Romania was being
driven slowly but surely into Germany’s sphere o f influence by French and British
indifference and reluctance to offer help. During King Carol’s November 1938 visits to
London, Paris, and Berlin, Romania’s desperate demands for economic assistance received
no assuring responses from London and Paris. Gunther concluded that “since the Western
democracies have either been unable or unwilling to assist Romania in its gallant efforts to
maintain its economic independence or prepare for future defense, they have only

1 Sumner Welles w rote in his memoirs,’’...the agricultural products upon which the
economy o f the Balkan nations depended so large an extent were not required by
American importers.” Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1944), p. 253.
2N.A., 871.24/152.
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circumstances and themselves to blame should this country come to fall into a species o f
economic vassalage to Germany.”3
American economic interests in Romania were limited to selected areas, such as:
royalties from motion pictures, oil refining, rental for business machines and
manufacturing rights to tires, cosmetics, parachutes, and oil well equipment. In 1938—
4.92 percent o f Romanian imports ($ 6,500,000)—the United States was seventh among
countries in value o f goods exported to Romania, with automobiles and different
machinery comprising the largest part. The United States ranked fifteenth with 1.31
percent o f Romanian exports ($ 2,000,000) to foreign countries. Exports to America
consisted primarily o f lambskin, sugar, beet pulp, hams in tins, and wood pulp.4 The
Romanian Ministry o f Economy hoped to stimulate the American demand for additional
Romanian products, especially wines and plum brandy ( t u i c a ), by displaying them at the
Romanian pavilion at the New York W orld’s Fair o f 1939.
The main American firms in Romania included Romano-Americana, a subsidiary o f
Standard Oil Co. o f New Jersey that extracted and refined oil; Vacuum Oil Co. in refining;
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) in the operation o f telephone systems and in
manufacturing; International Harvester in sales o f agricultural machinery; Ingersoll-Rand
in steel production; and Ford with an automobile assembly plant.5 A survey o f the U.S.

3 Ibid.
4N.A., Record Group 84, Bucharest Legation, General Records, 1940, Box 1. For more
information, see Ion Stanciu, “Relatiile comerciale” (Commercial Relations).
5N.A., Record Group 84, Bucharest Legation, General Records, 1940, Box 1.
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Department o f Commerce dated May 26, 1938, estimated that the American economic
investments in Romania exceeded $ 200 million.6
Romanian distributors had connections with American m otor companies, such as
Ford and Nash. Shipments o f automobiles were made through Hamburg up to 1939. Due
to the instability o f the European political situation after the Nazi occupation o f Bohemia
and Moravia, shipments were then sent through the Romanian harbor o f Constanta.
American investments in Romanian oil industry were assessed in August 1939 at
more than $26 million for the Romano-Americana and Vacuum Oil Co.7 In 1938, when
the Romanian government began more restrictive regulations o f the country’s natural
resources and dollar reserves, Romano-Americana experienced some problems. The
company had 850,000 Turkish pounds blocked by the Turkish government in the clearing
account o f Romania with the National Bank o f Turkey. Romano-Americana’s manager
feared that Romanian officials would not be firm enough with the Turkish government to
recoup the money for fear o f endangering the cooperation within the Balkan Entente.
Romano-Americana had difficulties doing business with the Romanian National Bank
because it was obliged, together with all companies exporting merchandise from Romania,
to deposit most o f hard currencies it earned into accounts at that bank. In 1938, the

6 FRUS. 1 9 3 9 ,1, p. 75. Direct commercial investments in Romania rose at $ 46 million;
Romano-Americana ($ 26 million) and ITT ($16 million) were the main official American
businesses. Also, the survey counted Romania’s war debts ($ 64 million) and the various
Romanian bonds owned by American citizens ($ 20,531,500). N.A., Record Group 84,
Bucharest Legation, General Records, 1940, Box 1.
7 N.A., Record Group 84, Bucharest Legation, General Records, 1940, Box 1. In 1938,
the executive branch o f Romano-Americana moved to Brussels for administrative reasons.
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American company found itself with no dollars to pay its employees or to make different
payments.

The cause o f these problems lay in the absence o f a clearing agreement

between the United States and Romania. The situation was resolved by finding a loophole
in the clearing convention with Great Britain whereby Romano-Americana worded its
requests for hard currency so that it would appear that the funds were needed to pay debts
due to England and not to Romania.8
The Romanian government tried to encourage American businessmen interested in
understanding the situation o f and developing trade with Romania. In September 1938,
Romanian officials invited Dr. Thomas Watson, President o f the International Chamber o f
Commerce and o f International Business Machines Company, to discuss American
business opportunities in Romania and the possible granting o f U.S. credits for Romanian
purchase o f American munitions and arms. Franklin Gunther M ott asserted that Watson
sympathized with Romania’s requests and opined that because the country bought a lot
from the United States, it should be helped. He was among the American businessmen
who thought that the United States “made a great mistake ... in not trying to help some o f
these smaller countries in Southeastern Europe. ...The value in friendship and trade would
bring to the United States a far greater return than ... pressing them on the debt.”9
Since 1938, the Romanian government had expressed interest in enhancing its
defense capabilities. Unfortunately it was too late to build up a Romanian defense
industry and to equip the army with modem technology and arms. A report o f the

8 N.A., 871.5151/110.
9N.A., 871.24/147.
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Romanian Prime Minister Armand Calinescu, dated June 1939, showed that between 1920
and February 1938 the Romanian government had spent 25 million lei for national defense
in contrast to the 36 million lei spent from February 1938 to June 1939.10 The constant
Romanian preoccupation with armaments was noticed even by the American Embassy in
Rome. On August 21, 1937, Colonel C.H. Paine, American Military Attache in Italy,
notified the Department o f State that the Romanian government had purchased thirty
training planes from the Italian government in exchange for crude oil.11 Also, in
November 1937, the Romanian government approached the Douglas and Lockheed
companies to purchase aircraft valued at $1 million. The Romanian civilian airlines,
LARES, bought two Douglas DC-3 airplanes and four Lockheed 14s, both with Wright
Cyclone motors, and three Lockheed Electras with Pratt-Whitney m otors.12 The
following year, Romanian officials concluded a deal with an American company, U.S.
Ordinance Engineers, Inc. to build a plant in Romania specializing in manufacturing aerial
bom bs.13 This company had similar contracts in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
In September 1938, on the eve o f the Munich crisis, the American M inister in
Bucharest started to notice that Romanian officials were more favorably disposed toward
American business interests than before.14 King Carol II had decided to turn to the United
States for armaments because he considered the Czechoslovak, British, and German
markets unreliable due to the tense European situation. He realized that these countries,

10 Zaharia and Calafeteanu, p. 317. See also The New York Times. June 29, 1939, 12.
’’ N A , 871,248/21.
12N.A., 871.248/22,23.
13 N.A., 871.24/146.
14 Ibid.
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especially Czechoslovakia and Great Britain, had to meet their own armament needs
because a conflict with Germany seemed probable. Carol’s aimed to achieve uniformity of
equipment and therefore chose the American armaments and munitions as the standard.
Minister Gunther insistently asked the State Department for a positive reply that would
satisfy the King and be beneficial for American business interests. The U.S. government
could not directly engage arms traffic on account o f the severe embargo established by the
Neutrality Acts o f 1935 and 1937, but it could inquire about private firms’ and banks’
willingness to do business and give credits to Romania. Cordell Hull advised the
Romanian government to negotiate credits directly with American banks even though he
had little expectation that the latter would thereby want to extend credit: “In view o f the
unsatisfactory manner in which that Government was servicing its bonds now held in this
country, and in view o f the present situation in Europe, it would seem to be unlikely that
[American] banks would undertake to furnish credit to Rumania at this time.” 15
In January 1939, General Negri, Romanian Minister o f Armament, contacted the
American Commercial Attache in Bucharest, Richardson, to discuss Romania’s desire to
purchase anti-aircraft equipment, artillery, planes, and other armaments in the United
States. The Department o f State replied to the Romanian inquiry late in May 1939, stating
that it could not intervene with private American armament manufacturers while offering
its own information as long as no military secrets were involved. Cordell Hull replied:
“The Rumanian government like other foreign governments was, o f course, free to enter
the American market to purchase arms. I would n o t ... take any initiative to arrange for

15 N.A., 871.24/147.
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the sale o f arms to Rumania, and ... I could not undertake to negotiate with the Rumanian
government or with the government o f any other foreign country.” 16 The Romanian order
for 200 anti-aircraft guns and 400 anti-tank guns could not be fulfilled because the
American industry did not manufacture such guns; also, no 47 mm guns were in use in the
United States. The 37 and 75 mm anti-aircraft guns could be ordered on the basis o f 25
percent cash payment with the order and the other 75 percent on delivery which could not
be expected in less than a year.17
The main difficulty in contracting for armaments encountered by the Romanian
government in the United States was its lack o f cash and the absence o f American credit.
A possible solution resided in the Romanian-British commercial treaty o f May 1939. The
Romanians regarded it not only as a means o f strengthening the relationship with Great
Britain, but also o f satisfying Romania’s growing need for arms. Victor Slavescu, the
Minister o f Armament, intended to purchase arms in the United States with part o f the five
million pounds o f British credit obtained through the treaty. Because Great Britain could
not provide Romania with guns equal to this value, Romanians were hoping that, through
the intervention o f the U.S. State Department, they could utilize part o f the British credit
to purchase American armament.18
Gunther was aware that Germany, because it favored the barter system, would
take advantage o f Romania’s desire to acquire armament rapidly and without any
immediate cash payments. He noted that “the dire and immediate need o f Romania for

16N.A., 871.24/168.
17N.A., 871.24/169.
18 Ibid.
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armament provided tremendous latent possibilities for Germany to apply pressure for extra
liberality in the application” o f the economic agreement o f 1939.19
The authorized dealer for Ford in Romania, Nicolae Perry-Porutiu, a naturalized
Austrian citizen from Cluj, offered to import airplanes, parts, and airplane accessories for
which payments could made in New York against credit documents. He expressed his
interest in specific types o f equipment including heavy military bombers, high-speed fighter
planes, airplanes for medical purposes as well as light, medium, and heavy passenger
planes for civilian purposes.20 To date, no documents have been found to follow up on the
story o f Romanian requests for armaments in the United States. But the November 1939
telegrams o f Gunther M ott revealed the success o f another order placed in the United
States by the Romanian government for 500 truck chassis and other equipment valued at
$1 million—undoubtedly needed by the Romanian army.21 The lack o f dollar exchange
obliged the Romanian government to place the bulk o f its other orders with Germany and
Great Britain where they could be paid through clearing. The American

$ 1 million

19 Ibid.
20 N. A , 871.248/25. At this stage o f the research, no documents were found to confirm
his intervention on behalf o f Romanian government.
21 The orders were place with Ford subsidiaries from Romania, Great Britain, the United
States, and Germany. From England: 1500 ambulances and 400 trucks suitable for
conversion into ambulances; from Germany: 250 Ford trucks; from the United States:
500 Ford trucks with Marmon Harrington drive (four wheels); from local stock: 250
trucks, 80 air force trucks for searchlights, 23 commissary and kitchen trucks, and six
mobile service stations. (N.A., 871.24/182). A telegram o f the Legation in Bucharest,
dated December 11, 1939, informed the State Department that the entire order o f Ford
trucks from the United States was paid integrally and would be delivered by the end o f the
year. The Romanian officials were impressed with the promptitude o f American
manufacturers and placed another order o f 1,000 similar trucks valued at $ 2,500,000.
The shipment o f ambulances from Great Britain sunk on its way to Romania. (N.A.,
871.24/191). See also New York Times. December 8, 1939, 13.
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would be split between Marmon Harrington ($ 440,000) and Ford ($ 560,000). Marmon
Harrington was to be paid cash with the order. In order to pay Ford, the first

$

400,000 was to be immediately transferred to New York, and the local Ford subsidiary
was to advance a balance o f $ 134,000. The Romanian government arranged to cover the
sums by a $ 600,000 credit opened with the Chase National Bank o f New York. Its future
plans included a purchase o f 276 similar truck chassis and sixty tractors with trailers
valued at about S 800,000.22 Unfortunately, the Secretary o f American Legation in
Bucharest, Frederick Hibbard, expressed his doubts that “in view o f the threatening
political situation, it was uncertain whether the Romanian government would be able to
obtain delivery o f any o f the equipment ordered from abroad.”23
The desire o f Romanian officials to do business with American firms was
demonstrated by their willingness to find reasonable means for payments. The dollar
reserve held by the Romanian National Bank was very low because exports to the United
States in 1938 were only S 2,537,000.24 Frederick Hibbard considered the sacrifices made
by Romania to find $ 1 million as “an interesting index o f intense desire to improve its
defense as rapidly as possible and at any cost.”25
The Romanian government’s efforts to contract for arms production in the United
States in the fall o f 1939 paralleled those o f a private Romanian firm, SAREP (Societatea

22 N.A., 871.24/180.
23 Ibid.
24 The order placed with American firms was o f $ 1 million which represented almost half
o f the dollar reserves o f Romania.
25 N.A., 871.24/180. In 1938, Romanian officials started an intense activity for
strengthening the defense capabilities o f the country. For more details, see Zaharia and
Calafeteanu, The National Defense, and Talpes, Diplomacy and Defense.
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Romana de Representare), which was interested in marketing in Romania anti-aircraft
guns o f 25 to 100 mm and anti-tank guns o f 47 mm.26 SAREP used the American
Legation in Bucharest as an intermediary to gather information about American firms
willing to sell these products to Romania. Their inquiry was taken by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce which advised the firm to contact a series o f American private manufacturers
and to deal directly with them. Some o f them, such as Bethlehem Steel, o f Pennsylvania,
Midvale Company, o f Nicetown, Philadelphia, and the Federal Laboratories Inc.,
Pittsburgh expressed their reluctance to supply any kind o f armament material, so the
inquiries o f the Romanian firm did not materialize in any concrete exports concerning
these companies.
Lack o f raw materials for the domestic armament industry persuaded the
Romanian government also to turn to the United States for help. The requests for
aluminum and copper, badly needed by the Romanian airplane industry,27 were rejected by
American private industries which did not want to provide raw or semi-manufactured
material for the building up o f competing industries in Europe. Also, aluminum was
included on the Army and Navy Munitions Board list o f strategic and critical materials.28
Colonel MacMorland from the Army and Navy Munitions Board reported to the State
Departm ent that the Romanian Minister in Washington and former Romanian Minister o f

26 The U.S. Chamber o f Commerce ran a check on SAREP and concluded it was joint
stock company, owned by two Polish citizens, Oscar and Bernard Allerhand, with a capital
o f 1 million lei.
27 According to one telegram, 100 tons o f aluminum could help manufacture 100 planes.
(N.A., 871.24/192).
28 Army and Munitions Board, The Strategic and Critical Materials. M arch 1940.
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Air, Radu Irimescu, could not pursue his government’s desire to purchase 100 tons o f
ingot aluminum and 18 to 20 tons o f electrolytic ingot copper due to the refusal o f the
Aluminum Co. and Anaconda Copper Co. to sell these materials. Desperate, Irimescu
tried to convince MacMorland that the order would be accepted if only the government
would approve it first. He even assured Cordell Hull that this aluminum would be used
exclusively for Romanian needs and would not be reexported.29
The reluctance o f American private industry to satisfy Romania’s desire to buy raw
material and arms may be explained by the tense international situation in the fall o f 1939.
The war had already started in Europe, and the United States’ government was preparing
its strategic reserves in case o f a future participation.30 Although the Neutrality Act o f
1939 abolished the arms embargo, it anticipated that the belligerent states which had
greatest need for American armaments would be the main beneficiaries o f “cash-andcarry” provisions. Romania, as a neutral country, could not have the same claims on
American sympathies than would the nations at war with Germany.

29 N.A., 871.24/190. Also, the Romanian government empowered Wachner, the head o f
the Romanian Ford subsidiary, to negotiate the purchase o f raw rubber for the local
Banloc-Goodrich Tire Factory, tires and 40,000 square yards o f canvas for the
manufacture o f tops for trucks. He did not have any success in convincing the American
manufacturers to sell him rubber. (N.A., 871.24/193). See also New York Times. April
30, 1940, 6.
30 For example, on June 7, 1939, the U.S. Congress passed a legislation stating that it was
the policy o f Congress to provide for acquisition o f stocks o f “certain strategic and critical
materials being deficient or insufficiently developed to supply the military, industrial, and
naval needs o f the country for common defense ... in times o f national emergency.” Peace
and War: United States Foreign Policy. 1931-1941 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1943), p. 63.
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The desire for armament expressed constantly by the Romanian officials in the
period between 1938 and 1940 brought to light the issue o f Romania’s public debts to the
W estern powers and the United States. King Carol’s drive to obtain arms and equipment
from the United States and his requests for credits obliged the American banks and private
manufacturers to evaluate Romania’s credit worthiness.
Romanian officials regarded the issue o f armaments and credits as being one with
deep political and international implications—a means to stop German economic
penetration in East Central Europe and to preserve the political sovereignty and territorial
integrity o f the country. The American side viewed the same problems in much more
economic terms—the ultimate question was whether Romania would be able or not to pay
back any money loaned. As Minister Gunther said, “...our banks presumably were not
particularly interested in the point o f policy as to just how far we might wish to go, if we
could, to counteract German economic penetration.”31 American officials had not
forgotten the Romanian debt toward the United States, although Romania had announced
it would stop payments after the Hoover M oratorium o f 1932. Unlike Romania,
Americans regarded with respect Finland and Hungary because they had paid their war
debts.
Starting in 1938, Romania was willing to negotiate a reasonable settlement o f its
public debts in the United States. The debts included the Romanian war debt, the payment
o f which was halted on August 14, 1933, and the 1929 stabilization and development loan

31 N.A., 871.24/151.
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which was the biggest issue.32 In 1929, the Romanian Peasant Party contracted a seven
percent stabilization loan, payable in three currencies: American dollars, French francs,
and English pounds. The loan was guaranteed with bonds issued by the Kingdom o f
Romania M onopolies Institute. This institution was created by the “Law Concerning the
Creation o f the Institute” promulgated by the Kingdom o f Romania in accordance with the
“Program o f the Romanian Government for Monetary Stabilization and Economic
Development,” which constituted Annex A to the Monetary Law adopted and
promulgated on February 7, 1929. The Institute was owned by the Romanian state. Its
revenues were derived from the government monopolies o f tobacco, salt, matches,
explosives, cigarette paper, and playing cards and were allotted to the service o f the
Romanian public debt. The fiscal agents o f the Romanian government in the United States
were City Bank Farmers Trust Co. (which succeeded to Blair & Co.), the Chase National
Bank o f New York, and Dillon, Read & Co.33
Because o f the unfavorable trade balance between Romania and the United States,
payments could only be made through the transformation o f Romanian exports into
dollars. The Great Depression and the difficulties encountered by Romanian exporters,
especially those o f raw materials, like grains, wood, and oil, made the further payment o f
dividends impossible. In 1934, to solve the situation, the Romanian government asked its
W estern creditors, including the United States, for a tri-annual arrangement adapted to its
weak payment capabilities. The agreement between Romania and its European creditors

32 N ew York Times. May 5, 1939, 40.
33 N.A., 871.51/169.
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was signed on July 24, 1934, and renewed in 1937, without the participation o f the
American side whose members refused to take part. The situation was further
complicated by the worsening o f Romanian trade with the West and the blockage o f its
funds abroad. The only remaining means by which Romania could pay interest on bonds
held by foreigners was through clearing agreements with the countries in which the bond
holders were citizens. These understandings were very detrimental to the Romanian
economy.34 Romania even instituted a monetary premium for the creditor countries with
which she had clearing agreements in order to stimulate their interest in Romanian
exports.35 The payment o f the Romanian bonds in the United States was rendered harder
by the lack o f any clearing arrangement between the two countries. The U.S. Department
o f State, particularly Cordell Hull, believed such agreements would have harmful effects
on trade and would lead ultimately to the unbalancing o f international economic
relations.36
The American holders o f Romanian Institute External Sinking Fund Gold Bonds
became members o f the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., which represented
their interests with the foreign governments.

Starting in 1937, this financial organization

contacted the Romanian authorities to push for a settlement o f the Romanian

34 For example, the clearing agreement with Great Britain contained the stipulation that
sixty percent o f the proceeds o f the sale o f Romanian exports in England must be used for
the purchase o f British commodities, thirty percent for service on British-owned bonds or
other debt payments to residents o f Great Britain, and only ten percent o f the sterling
exchange created by exports were to be used by Romania for the maintenance o f its
Legation and Consulates in Great Britain and for any other purpose. (N.A., 871.51
Rumanian Loan/187).
35 Memorandum o f the Royal Romanian Legation in Washington. N. A., 871.51RL/157.
36N.A., 871.51RL/187.
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governm ent’s obligations. This year was o f importance for the Romanian and American
sides. N ot only were the Paris agreements renewed, but also large quantities o f Romanian
foreign bonds were purchased at a big discount on foreign markets and brought back to
Romania to secure the payment o f interest in lei. A royal decree asked that all repatriated
bonds be registered and the dollar coupons be paid at an exchange rate o f 167.18 lei per
dollar. Although the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council was sympathetic with
Rom ania’s delicate economic situation, it also acknowledged the American bondholders’
impatience with and criticism o f Romania. The Minister o f Finance expressed his desire to
reach an understanding with the American side and advised it to join the Paris agreements
o f 1934 and 1937.37
At least tw o civil cases were brought against the Kingdom o f Romania by
American citizens in the United S ta te s —H a n n e s v. K in g d o m o f R o m a n i a and L ic h t e n s t e i n
v. K i n g d o m o f R o m a n i a —in which the Romanian government claimed its right o f
immunity. For example, in 1939, Lillian Hannes, a resident o f the New Y ork State, sued
the Romanian government for $33,600 in unpaid interest coupons. As part o f her action,
she obtained a warrant o f attachment against funds allegedly owned by the Institute on
deposit with the City Bank Farmers Trust Company.38 Herman Cooper, the lawyer for
Lillian Hannes, w rote to Cordell Hull and denied Romanian government’s right to seek
immunity. He cited a case in 1924 when Romanian courts placed in the “jus gestionis”
category—not entitled to sovereign immunity—transactions relating to the tobacco

37 N.A., 871.51RL/165, 157.
38 New York Times. June 21, 1940, 33.
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monopoly o f the Polish government.39 The State Department replied that it could not
take an official position toward the matter and authorized the State o f New Y ork’s
Supreme Court to uphold or deny the immunity o f the Romanian state. Until 1940, the
m atters were not solved between the Romanian government and the American
bondholders.40
The constant attention given to the military needs o f the Romanian government
changed the structure and priorities o f Romanian trade. In the fall o f 1939, Frederick
Hibbard warned the State Department that Romania’s imports from the United States
“would be restricted to commodities deemed o f vital importance to national defense”—
arms and raw materials destined for the local armament industry.41 “Luxury” imports
would be severely curtailed if not entirely stopped. N o dollar exchange was provided for
imports from the United States during the second quarter o f 1938, with the exception o f
those items considered essential by the Romanian governm ent-autom otive vehicles, oil
well machinery, and certain raw and other material needed for armaments or other
manufactures.42

39 The Romanian court held that when a state undertakes activities o f a commercial nature,
similar in nature to those in which an individual would engage, controversies arising out o f
such transactions are subject to the jurisdiction o f foreign courts in the same manner as if
an individual were involved. (N.A., 871.51RL/172).
40 In addition to the Romanian government’s debts to the United States’ citizens, there
were also the unpaid debts o f Romanian companies or private citizens for American
merchandise which totaled $25,408.13 in June 1938. Between this time and July 1939,
were already liquidated another $13 .197.46. The remainder consisted o f sums owed by
bad debtors and collection could be effected only through continued pressure or court
action. (N.A., 871.5151/142).
41 N.A., 871.24/180,193.
42 N. A., 871.4061M P/21. The quota o f exchange earmarked for imports from any country
during a certain quarter was based on the exports to that country during the preceding
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M otion pictures, although occupying an important part in the trade relations
between Romania and the United States,43 suffered from the lack o f dollar exchange and
the constant modifications o f the Romanian tax system. Harold Smith, the representative
o f M PPDA in Paris, repeatedly expressed his concern with the high Romanian taxes which
drove motion picture theater owners out o f business. As a result, the distributors o f
American movies found it difficult to conduct business in Romania. Paramount closed its
offices in Romania in June 1939.44 Smith requested Gunther to ask Romanian officials to
have at least the import duties reduced. The latter was aware that because taxes were an
internal problem, he could not intervene.
The Romanian distributors for the five major American motion picture companies
complained about the difficulties they encountered in obtaining import authorizations and
obtaining advertising material sent over from the United States. Up to the end o f 1937,
motion pictures were imported into Romania on the basis o f import authorizations and
film quotas issued quarterly by the Ministry o f Industries and Commerce. Payments were
made^ through the compensation systenyin foreign exchange available to exporters after
obtaining approval from the Romanian National Bank.45 At the beginning o f 1938, the

quarter. Exports to the United States during the first quarter o f 1938 amounted to only
81 million lei while imports were valued at 262 million lei. The Romanian National Bank
simply did not have the dollar exchange to allow more American imports. (Ibid.)
43 The import o f American movies brought indirectly considerable revenue to the
Romanian treasury. Gunther M ott estimated gains o f approximately 500 million lei per
year from different taxes on the motion picture business. (N.A., 871.4061MP/21).
44 N.A., 871.4061MP/26.
45 The object o f the system o f compensation trading was to stimulate the exportation o f
certain selected goods, included on a list A, which normally were difficult to market
abroad. Exporters o f these goods were permitted to retain varying percentages o f the
resulting exchange and sell it, at a price established by negotiation, to importers o f another
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Ministry o f Industry and Commerce issued instructions that the importation o f motion
pictures from the United States on the basis o f the “compensation” system were to be
made only in compensation for peas. The local film dealers complained that exportation o f
peas from Romania was very limited and the growing season was over. Thus, they lacked
dollars to continue motion pictures importation and found their businesses at a standstill.46
The unresolved issue o f discrimination against American goods rose again. The Division
o f European Affairs, Department o f State, and the American Legation in Bucharest were
flooded with letters from the Paris office o f Harold Smith who requested a firm U.S.
intervention to restore motion picture rights in Romania. Smith’s main argument for such
official interference was that importation o f German, Italian, Polish, and other foreign
films to Romania allegedly could be done without any currency problems.
On May 17, 1938, Gunther saw Mitita Constantinescu, Minister o f National
Economy and Governor o f the Romanian National Bank, who was not sympathetic to the
compensation system. The American Minister then asked for a return to the situation
existing before September 1937, with the understanding that the film distributors would
export everything to the United States in their own names and for their own account.47
The local distributors were willing, after securing licenses, to export whatever products

restricted list o f goods included on a list B. For more details, see M ircea M usat and Ion
Ardeleanu, Romania dupa M area Unire (Romania after the Great Union), Volume 2, Part
2, November 1933-September 1940 (Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica,
1989), pp. 46-55 and 79-90.
46 N.A., 871.4061 MP/14. As Gunther humorously noted, “The fortunate exporters o f
peas have found themselves in the possession o f a monopoly o f exchange which motion
picture importers have been forced to purchase at exaggerated prices.” (N. A.,
871.4061MP/22).
47 N.A., 871.4061MP/19.
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they could to the United States with the right to retain the resulting exchange for the
payment o f royalties or other debts to the American film industry. In case no dollar
sources would be found, the distributors o f U.S. motion pictures in Romania threatened to
boycott film importation from the United States.48
The Romanian Minister o f Economy could not ignore the fact that American
movies had the largest share o f the Romanian motion picture market and appeared to be
the favorite o f Romanian viewers. An eventual halt to U.S. film importation would
therefore have led to the closing o f some theaters. At the end o f June 1938, due in part to
the diligent efforts o f Gunther and the intervention o f the Romanian Foreign Minister,
Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, the Ministry o f Economy decided to include motion pictures
on compensation list B 49
By the end o f 1938, motion picture distributors in Romania had something to
celebrate and their troubles seemed to be over. I.D. Suchianu, a reputable Romanian film
critic who was sympathetic to the American film industry, was named head o f the
Romanian M otion Picture Office and the Board o f Censors.50 He favored the expansion

48 Ibid.
49 N.A., 871.4061MP/22. The exchange dollars were to be provided by the exportation o f
Romanian lard; canned meats o f any kind; dressed poultry; Romanian rugs; lucem, clover,
and other forage seeds except peas; mustard and poppy seeds; hemp, flax, and sunflower
seeds; tom ato extract and juice; canned fruits and vegetables; liquors; plum brandy (>tu ic a );
champagne; and native knit goods and embroideries.
50 He was anti-Nazi, the brother-in-law o f the Minister o f Labor, Mihail Ralea, and firstcousin o f the Minister o f Interior and future Prime-Minister, Armand Calinescu. Minister
Gunther praised his commitment to American films: “I was struck by his keen interest in
furthering the market for American motion pictures in this country as well as by his
eagerness to espouse the cause o f the motion picture distributors.” (N. A.,
871.4061MP/24).
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o f the American movie market in Romania and helped a series o f movies, which were
rejected before his appointment, meet Romanian censorship guidelines. Suchianu
expressed his willingness to grant a “concession” to the local representatives o f the
American motion picture industry for the distribution o f educational films.51 Since they
never made money on such movies, he suggested a scale o f exhibition fees on such films to
be paid by every motion picture theater in the country. In return, the profits would be split
in three parts between the film distributors—fifty percent, the Cultural Propaganda F u n d twenty percent, and the members o f the Board o f Censors—thirty percent.52
In making this proposal, Suchianu tried to counteract the efforts o f a Sibiu
independent motion picture distribution company, Astra Culturala, the owner o f the big
Aro theater in Bucharest, among others, to monopolize the distribution o f educational
films in Romania. Because most members o f Astra Culturala were o f German origin,
Suchianu was afraid that granting them this monopoly would lead to the exclusive
exhibition o f German educational films devoted to Nazi propaganda. Unfortunately, the
continental managers for the American companies who sold films to Romania did not
understand the importance o f the proposal and considered it a dangerous establishment o f
a monopoly. They even threatened that if Suchianu persisted in his plan to form a
monopoly, the American companies might withdraw from Romania.53

51 All motion picture theaters in Romania were required by law to open their presentations
with an educational film.
52 N.A., 871.4061MP/24.
53 Ibid.
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Despite Romania’s efforts to regulate its trade with the United States, the
economic and financial relations between the two countries remained tenuous and even
diminished with the beginning o f World War II and the continual investments by German
firms in the Romanian economy. The problem o f debt put a strain on the relationship
between the two countries and negatively affected Romania’s image in the eyes o f
American bankers and businessmen. Also, the motion picture industry was mostly inclined
to stop doing business with the Romanian state due to its tight control on hard currency.
The documents cited in this thesis could point toward the conclusion that Romania tried to
orient its armament requests toward the United States, especially after M arch 1939.
Romanian officials were aware that Romania’s European contractors—Czechoslovakia,
Great Britain, and France—were having a hard time meeting their own needs. But the
United States decided to pay more attention to their own strategic and defensive needs.
Therefore, Romania found it impossible to acquire the necessary means o f ensuring an
effective defense. Its continuous political and military isolation was accompanied by a
gradual, but important orientation toward Germany’s sphere o f influence, in hope o f
obtaining armaments in exchange for grain and oil.

81

Chapter 4 —The Image of Romania and Her Rulers:
A View of the American Press
In democratic societies, mass-media and public organizations seek to and to some
extent do influence the decision-making in foreign policy. They also express public
opinion tow ard events, countries, and personalities. Particularly in the United States, the
media has played an important role in shaping public perceptions o f foreign countries. In
the late 1930s, Romania’s image in American media and government documents was
conditioned by some important issues, such as Romania’s treatment o f ethnic minorities, in
particular the Jewish population, the extent to which King Carol’s dictatorship appeared
to improve Romanian national stability against Germany and the Soviet Union, and
Rom ania’s geo-strategic position in the Balkans and its natural resources.
Up to the early 1930s, the American citizens knew Romania as a kingdom
characterized by an interesting and puzzling melange o f intrigue, corruption, and
romanticism. Queen M arie’s undeniable personal charm gave rise to numerous rumors,
explicitly detailed in European and American newspapers, about her innumerable love
affairs. H er son, the young and restless Prince Carol o f Romania, also made the front
pages o f the yellow press in the 1920s with his amorous adventurous youth.1 In June
1930, the Romanian royal family again became front page news when Prince Carol

1 In 1918, Prince Carol o f Romania deserted the Romanian army and married the
commoner Zizi Lambrino. He also sent a letter to the Parliament that he renounced his
right to the throne. Through the diligent efforts o f Queen Marie, his marriage was
annulled as incompatible with the status o f the Royal Romanian House. In 1925, Carol
left for W estern Europe and established with his mistress, Elena Lupescu, in France. In
January 1926, the Romanian Parliament revoked his rights to the throne and declared his
young son Michael as future king under a Regency with three members.
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returned suddenly from exile and claimed his right to the throne. Romania was often
portrayed by the American press as a “colorful kingdom” with happy, carefree people and
nch natural resources.

Some journalists contended that “the average Rumanian was a

kindly, easy-going fellow who did not care, and had no intention to make any effort.”1
Also, the Romanians’ capacity to govern themselves was sometimes questioned by the
American media. A 1939 article in the New York Times described Romania’s government
as one familiar with “assassination, corruption, and romanticism.”4 Sumner Welles, the
U.S. Undersecretary o f State in the 1930s, also took a critical view o f Romanian politics:
Popular government had never in reality existed, and there had been no real
foundation for the establishment o f popular authority. The government had
all been superstructure—and superstructure o f the shoddiest variety. That
was why, in the late thirties, we saw the final collapse o f national authority
into such grotesque forms as the Goga and Antonescu governments; such
Nazi-inspired aberrations as Codreanu and the Iron Guard; and the
hysterical resort, through Hitler’s influence, to such hideous atrocities as
those committed upon the Jewish people.5

The interest o f the American press about Romania in late 1930s was obvious from
the telegrams sent by the Romanian Legation in Washington to the Ministry o f
Propaganda in Bucharest. In October 1939, Horia Babes, Press Secretary at the
Romanian Legation in Washington, asked Alexandru Radian, the Minister o f Propaganda,

2 The New Republic. October 26, 1938, p. 325.
3 Shandon Hastings, “Romania’s Uneasy Seat,” Current History. M arch 1939, p. 38.
4N ew Y ork Times. September 24, 1939, 39.
5 Welles, p. 251.
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for new photos as well as big and detailed maps o f Romania because the main U.S.
newspapers and magazines incessantly demanded these materials.6
From his coming to power until December 1937, King Carol II experimented with
various strategies designed to undermine the traditional political parties and to convert the
Romanian political system into a royal dictatorship. The December 1937 elections marked
an interesting point in the internal political life o f Romania. Their result indicated the
electorate’s confusion about the struggle for power between the traditional parties, the
National Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party. No party obtained the forty
percent o f votes necessary to form a parliamentary majority. M oreover, the right-wing
parties whose programs promised a new politics without corruption or political games
won a good share o f votes--the “All for the Country” party (the new name adopted by the
Iron Guard) won 15.58 percent and the Goga-Cuza National Christian Party won 9.15
percent.7 Both o f these political formations were strongly nationalistic and anti-Semitic
and sympathized with Nazism and Italian Fascism. Nevertheless, the Iron Guard was
more prone to employ violent methods and was better organized than its main right-wing
competitor, the Goga-Cuza party. Some journalists perceived the essence o f the Iron
Guard which had deep roots in local anti-Semitism and proclaimed the superiority o f the
national culture over those o f European Western nations. For example, the American
journalist Anne O ’Hare McCormick described the Iron Guard as being “Nazi in spirit and

6 Arhivele Statului, Bucuresti, Ministerul Propagandei Nationale, Dosar 720, Presa
Externa. Fila 1 (State Archives, Bucharest, Romania, Ministry o f National Propaganda,
Fila 720, Foreign Press. Page 1).
7 Al. Savu, Dictatura regala (The Royal Dictatorship) (Bucuresti: Editura Politica, 1970),
p. 115.
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in much o f its program. But it was about ninety-percent Rumanian Nazi, fiercely
nationalist, revolutionary, uniting some o f the best elements o f the young in a protest
against corruption, incompetence, and inertia in high places.”8 The Iron Guard attracted
the interest o f the American intelligence, especially after the beginning o f the war and
German military and political penetration o f East Central Europe. In 1940, U.S. Secretary
o f the Navy, Frank Knox, requested Colonel William Donovan and Edgar M owrer “to
make a thorough investigation o f the German methods used in weakening the resistance o f
possible enemies and o f undermining the morale o f the countries they propose to attack.”
The Romanian right-wing party was considered a subsidiary member o f the
Auslandorganisation (Organization Abroad) and in the pay o f Nazi Germany.9
King Carol decided that this was the right moment to fulfill his dream o f a royal
dictatorship. He brought to power the Goga-Cuza party, the rival o f the Iron Guard, in a
short-term government o f forty-four days. Its rule was enough to compromise the
attraction o f right-wing ideas and to encourage people’s preferences for having an
authoritarian ruler. As Minister Gunther observed, “the King had concluded that the
present was not a bad time to give nationalism a little rope and better to try it out now
with this Government than to have to later with the Iron Guard.” 10 Particularly, the antiSemitic legislation o f the National Christian Party, although not entirely enforced, proved

8 Anne O ’Hare McCormick, “Events Disposed o f Carol and a New ‘Strong M an’ Begins,”
The N ew York Times. September 7, 1940, 16. Also, Time magazine named the Iron
Guard, “the Ku Klux Rumanian organization,” Time. September 16, 1940, p. 34.
9 Whitney Shepardson, The United States in World Affairs: An Account o f American
Foreign Relations. 1938 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), p. 325-326.
10FRLJS, 1938, II, p. 674.
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sterile and detrimental for the Romanian economy.11 In February 1938, Carol seemed the
right person to establish order and discipline in Romania. The new constitution organized
Romania as a corporatist state and gave the King generous governing powers. Carol
named a puppet-govemment under the Romanian Orthodox Patriarch M iron Cristea and
outlawed all political parties. Instead he created the inclusive National Rebirth Front,
designed to mobilize popular support for the King and help reorganize Romania along
corporatist lines.
The changes in the Romanian political structure, particularly the bringing to power
o f an openly anti-Semitic party, worried the Western democracies which did not
understand the ultimate goal o f the King’s move. In the biography o f his grandfather, Paul
o f Hohenzollem noted that Carol “failed . . . to take in account the repercussions o f the
appointment outside the country, where it was seen as an anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi move.” 12
The Romanian government made no secret o f its desire for Romanian Jews to
emigrate. It did not oppose their leaving and facilitated their transfer. In a telegram dated
January 5, 1938, Gunther expressed his opinion that “the Government was intentionally
frightening Jews into leaving the country voluntarily and ... it would proceed with extreme
caution in the formulation and execution o f any concrete measures.” 13 Romanian officials
talked about a Jewish problem in their country and directed their pleas for help to the
international organizations, such as the League o f Nations and the Intergovernmental

11 M ost o f the businesses and commercial activities were owned by Romanian citizens o f
Jewish ancestry.
12 Paul o f Hohenzollem, King Carol II: A Life o f Mv Grandfather (London: Methuen,
1988), p. 176.
13 FRUS. 1938, II, p. 672-673.
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Committee.

They asked the two organizations to devise a method o f emigration o f at

least a small percentage o f Romanian Jews, about 50,000 .14 Gunther tried to maintain an
objective outlook on the Jewish “problem” in Romania and reported that “actual
Governmental regulation o f the Jewish population was really o f no outstanding severity.” 15
The problem o f minorities became more complicated because o f the Minorities
Law o f January 1938 which divided the Jewish population into two groups. The first
included approximately 800,000 Jews, who had established their status as Romanian
citizens. The other group numbered about 200,000 Jews who could not prove their
citizenship and were declared “foreigners.” The Romanian government tried to get rid o f
the second group by deporting them or encouraging them to leave the country on their
own account. As Minister Gunther wrote in one o f his reports, “The attitude o f the
Rumanian government was that this surplus o f population o f non-citizen Jews must go;

14 Ibid., 1939, II, p. 10. The Intergovernmental Committee was an organization created at
the initiative o f the United States at the Evian Refugee Conference in 1938. It had three
objectives: to arrange for orderly emigration o f refugees from Germany to negotiate with
countries o f settlem ent... and to help set up an international corporation for the financing
o f refugees from Germany. It soon became clear that Germany’s Jews were the first
priority o f the Committee because they were endangered by the pogroms. FRUS. 1939,
II, p. 102.
15 Ibid. His biggest fears were related to the arbitrary and corrupt procedures which
characterized Romanian local administration. Gunther was alarmed that “administrative
practice in applying laws and regulations offered large possibilities o f discrimination
against the Jews.” Even in August 1940, Frederick Hibbard remarked that the Romanian
Jews were not disturbed by some Romanian legislation directed against them. “They
knew,” said the Secretary o f the American Legation, “that repressive laws usually were
not nearly as bad as they sounded, that application and interpretation were o f far more
importance than the latter, that Governments and programs changed fast and that antiSemitic fever was like the malarial and flares up only to subside again.” The application o f
the laws by the Romanian administration, mostly corrupt, was most times different than
the letter o f the law.
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there would be no pogrom, no violence, no brutality, but they must go.” 16 A large part o f
the Romanian Jewish emigration aimed to go to the United States. In 1938, there were
approximately 15,000 visa applications for emigration at the American Legation in
Bucharest, ninety-eight percent o f which were made by the Jew s.17
Anti-Semitism in Romania was a subject that constantly preoccupied American
officials, organizations, and the media. In the United States, Carol’s decision to bring the
Goga-Cuza party and its anti-Semitic program to power produced a wave o f protests from
the American media and public organizations. As a demonstration o f his opposition to the
anti-Semitic measures o f the new Romanian government, the Romanian Minister to
Washington, Charles Davilla, resigned. The appointment o f his successor, M ajor Radu
Irimescu, was received with misgivings by American Jews. Republican Senator Lonergan
from Connecticut expressed to the U.S. Secretary o f State the anxiety o f the American
Jewish Congress about Irimescu’s former membership in the Goga government. (By the
time o f Irimescu’s appointment, the Goga-Cuza government had already resigned and the
King installed his personal dictatorship).18 Cordell Hull replied by praising the good
credentials o f the new Minister, including his degree in engineering at Columbia University
in 1920, his marriage to an American, his work experience with New York banking firms
(he was for a while director o f the Chrissoveloni Bank), and the good recommendations
from the last three American Ministers to Bucharest.19 Hull assured the Jewish Congress

16N.A., 871.4016Jew s/110.
17N.A., Record Group 84, American Legation in Bucharest. General Records, Box 1.
18 New York Times. M arch 11, 1938, 9.
19 Ibid.
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that there was no cause to be worried and that Romania would be fairly represented by
Irimescu.
One vocal critic o f the new Romanian government was the Jewish W ar Veterans of
the United States. On February 18, 1938, in their meeting in Camden, New Jersey, they
drafted a petition to President Roosevelt in which they asked him
to intercede with the Rumanian government to cease its viciously unjust
discrimination against its racial and religious minorities and above all put an
end to its cruel and barbarous mistreatment o f innocent Jewish citizens and
protect their lives and property in accordance with the covenants o f
existing international treaties to which the kingdom o f Rumania is a party.20

The Jewish veterans asked the American government to interrupt the U.S. diplomatic
relations with Romania in case their plea was ignored by the Romanian government.
American religious organizations held a poor opinion o f the Romanian Orthodox
Patriarch. Before becoming Prime Minister, Miron Cristea made some unfavorable
comments about the Romanian Jews, accusing them o f being corrupt. His opinion was
widely criticized by U.S. Christian publications, such as The Churchman. The American
press did not even want to consider the publication o f a letter o f Patriarch Cristea to Dr.
Niemirover, the Chief Rabi o f the United States.21 Also, the American Committee on
Religious Rights and Minorities objected to articles in Solia. the official organ o f the
Romanian Orthodox Church in America, which expressed the rightist and anti-Semitic

20 N.A., 871.4016Jews/95.
21 The letter was translated by American historian Charles Upson Clark. State Archives,
Bucharest, Romania, Ministry o f National Propaganda, File 485, Foreign Press, page 22.
The letter was finally published by Foaia Poporului (People’s Newspaper), Cleveland,
Ohio.
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sympathies o f some o f its members, including the Bishop. In a letter to Sumner Welles,
the U.S. Undersecretary o f State, the Committee complained about the articles in Solia
which “tended to propagate among American-Romanians the same racial hatred which had
so shamefully and disastrously resulted in persecution in Romania.”22 On some occasions,
the American press included favorable comments on Romania’s treatment o f minorities.
For example, the New York Times congratulated the Romanian government for the new
minority law o f July 1938 which gave equal rights to all citizens regardless o f their country
o f birth and named it one o f the most liberal in East-Central Europe.23
Officials in Washington approached the problem o f the treatment o f minorities
diplomatically and cautiously. The U.S. State Department, although well informed about
the Jewish issue in Romania, did not make any official protests and kept away from the
problem as long as the interests o f American citizens were not involved. In a letter to
Congressman Charles Wolverton, the State Department asserted that, “The American
government, in the absence o f treaty provisions, could not intervene in the domestic affairs
o f another country, except in special circumstances where American citizens or interests
w ere involved.”24 In a conversation with Pierrepont Moffat, Horia Babes, Romanian
Charge d ’Affaires, noted that “although much publicity had been given to the reports o f
anti-Semitic excesses in Romania, virtually no publicity had been given to a State
D epartm ent letter pointing out that it could not intervene in the Romanian picture.”25

22 N.A., 871.4016/217.
23 The New York Times. August 6, 1938, 2.
24 N.A., 871.4016Jews/95. Wolverton endorsed to the U.S. State Department a protest
letter from the Jewish W ar Veterans o f the United States.
25 N.A., 871.4016Jews/97.
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U.S. diplomats regarded the issue o f minorities as exclusively a Romanian problem and did
not want to meddle in the internal affairs o f that country. Nevertheless, the American
media and humanitarian organizations continued to pressure the U.S. government to ask
for improvements in the treatment o f Romanian Jews. The Romanian government agreed
with the State Departm ent’s position that the treatment o f Romanian Jews was an internal
problem and should not be the object o f foreign concerns. Romanian officials regarded
the critical articles in the American press and the interventions in Congress as mere noise
started by politicians eager to attract the votes o f the American Jewish population.26
American-Hungarians were the other group which used its influence in the United
States to protest against the treatment o f their co-nationals in Romania. Due to the
freedom o f expression o f the American press and the actions o f a powerful lobby in the
U.S. Congress, they succeeded to increasing the negative perception o f Romania.27 The
Congress o f Hungarians and Hungarian Americans living in the United States and Canada
expressed their opposition to the alleged persecution o f their 2,000,000 co-nationals living
in Romania.28 Their actions did not elicit a direct inquiry by the State Department to the
Romanian government but it further perverted the image o f Romania in the United States
as an uncivilized and persecutory state.

26 Opinion expressed by Horia Babes in a telegram to Alexandru Radian. State Archives,
Bucharest, Ministry o f Propaganda, File 485, Foreign Press. Page 67.
27 The American journalist Vernon McKenzie commented upon the Hungarians that, unlike
Romanians, they can lead a vigorous press campaign for revision. Part o f their action was
“to wreck the Rumanian government, if possible.” Vernon McKenzie, Through Turbulent
Years. (New York: Robert McBride and Co., 1938), p. 130.
28 The N ew York Times. March 13, 1938, 35.
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The American press intensely commented on Carol’s decision to bring the GogaCuza party to power. M ost o f the United States’ media and foreign policy analysts tried
as best they could to interpret the King’s move. For example, Peter Drucker in his
H arper’s Magazine article praised the shrewdness o f Carol in compromising the right-wing
movement and imposing his own regime:
King Carol, in one o f the most astute and most unscrupulous maneuvers in
the whole machiavellian history o f the Balkan politics first divided the
Fascist movement against itself by appointing the minority leader, Goga, to
be Prime-Minister in December 1937; then by forcing Goga to “Nazify” the
country in haste he managed to destroy all popular support for Nazism.29
Indeed, the weak Goga-Cuza party was not able to contain the anti-Semitic and
nationalist agitation initiated by the Iron Guard to destabilize Romania’s internal situation.
Carol II began his dictatorship under the pretext o f establishing order and discipline in the
country. Journalists acknowledged the fact that the National Christian Party in power did
not mean Romania’s adoption o f a Nazi regime. The Nation opined that had Carol
“wanted to turn the country over to a veritable, dynamic totalitarian, he would have called
upon Codreanu or Vaida-Voevod.... The purpose o f the royal move was thus clear
enough: it was a maneuver to preserve and consolidate the throne, to crush the peasant
left, and by the same stroke to take the wind o f Codreanu’s sails.”30

29 Peter Drucker, “Can Germany Win the Balkans?,” Harper’s M agazine. January 1939,
p. 150.
30 The Nation. January 8, 1938, p. 34. Also, Ronald Stuart Kain opined, “King Carol
established his own Fascist regime as a means o f fighting Nazism directed from Berlin.
The Fox o f the Balkans, as Carol had come to be called, proved ... ruthless, shrewd, and
successful.” Ronald Stuart Kain, Europe: Versailles to W arsaw (New York: The H.W.
Wilson Co., 1939), p. 256.
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Albert Carr analyzed the Romanian dictatorship in the context o f the economic and
social situation in the Balkans. He documented that Carol’s aims were to antagonize the
tw o main right-wing parties—the Iron Guard and the National Christian Party—and to
establish his own dictatorship. This development had become necessary in order to avoid
Rom ania’s complete domination o f Berlin. Carr concluded that Carol based his
dictatorship on the peasants and his reforms appealed mainly to this particular segment o f
the Romanian population.31
The European and American journalists who visited Romania between 1938 and
1940 praised King Carol’s efforts to expand Romania’s poorly developed industry and to
educate the peasants who formed seventy-eight percent o f the Romanian population.
M ost o f them observed the amazing urban development o f Bucharest, which occurred in
the 1930s, and contrasted with the poverty and social and economic backwardness o f the
countryside. G.E.R. Gedye, Chief Central Europe Correspondent o f the New York
Times, described in grim and critical words the social consequences o f rapid urbanization
in Bucharest. The houses in the poorest quarters, related Gedye, “were tumble-down,
overcrowded shacks at which a well-bred American hog would turn up his snout.”32 At
the same time, he noted the large number o f foreign cars filling the streets o f the “little
Paris,” as Bucharest was called in the 1930s.33 The American press emphasized King
Carol’s policy achievements, such as budgetary equilibrium, grants for the armed forces,

31 Albert Carr, Juggernaut; The Path o f Dictatorship (New York; The Viking Press,
1939), pp. 141-145.
32 N ew Y ork Times. February 3, 1938, 16.
33 Ibid.
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cheaper money, extensive public health campaigns, a new minority statute, and reforms in
the administrative, judicial and educational fields. This favorable picture was considered a
solid asset for the future resistance by Romania to German economic pressures.
Nevertheless, the press acknowledged Romania’s need to augment its trade with the West
in order to avoid increasing dependency on Germany.34
The former royal playboy had become a shrewd if authoritarian leader, trying to
play his cards with the Western democracies against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
In the eyes o f part o f the American media, Carol II appeared as the savior o f Romania and,
possibly, o f Eastern Europe by keeping the Romanian right-wing under control and
putting a stop to the internal political unrest. Contemporary analysts perceived the royal
dictatorship as a shrewd solution for keeping Romania succumbing to a fascist
government, dependent on Berlin, and for preserving Romania’s W estern orientation. The
N ew Y ork Times Magazine talked about Carol as making “history for his country and
perhaps also for all the world. Rumania was now in the cockpit o f European politics. . ..”35
The American press regarded the Balkans as a region where the interests o f the
Great Powers clashed. N o state was able to maintains its independence without seeking
protection from a European power. In the late 1930s, the situation became more
complicated because Germany and Italy began an aggressive campaign to attract the
Balkan states to their camp. In this context, Romania was a strategically important

34 “Where the Axes Cross. II. Rumania in Suspense,” The Living Age. July 1939, p. 416.
For a British view on Romania and King Carol’s achievements, see Charles Petrie,
“Rumania,” The Quarterly Review 272 (April 1939), pp. 308-323.
35 The New York Times. September 11, 1938, 11.
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country where German, Russian, French, and British interests collided. King Carol was
portrayed as balancing Romania’s fate among them. Journalists went so far as to see the
dictatorship as part o f a broad Western strategy to keep Germany out o f Romania and to
stop Germany’s “Drang nach Osten.” The New York Times o f February 16, 1938,
speculated that “larger interests than King Carol’s were involved in the outcome o f his
efforts to forestall a Nazi dictatorship by doing it first.... The change in the regime was
the first spectacular Rome-Berlin defeat and proved that the democratic powers could
exercise effective pressure when they wish.”36 The Times saw King Carol’s dictatorship
as the pillar o f country’s internal stability and a regional leader on which Britain and
France could rely. As late as February 1940, Life dedicated almost an entire issue to the
Romanian king and his heir, Prince Mihai, and commented that, unlike Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland which were swallowed up by Germany, Romania had by
complicated diplomatic maneuvers succeeded in preserving its independence and territory.
“Carol,” said one article, “was the smartest politician in the Balkans. Surrounded by landhungry nations, he made a deal with Germany one day, a concession to England the next,
countered a Russian move the third and had not yet been cornered by anybody.”37
Between 1938 and 1940, European and American journalists considered King
Carol a decisive actor in preventing Romania’s total surrender to Germany’s sphere o f
influence and in maintaining its friendly attitude toward the Western powers and its

36 The New York Times , February 16, 1939, 2.
37 Life, February 19, 1940, p. 77. Unfortunately, the praising o f King Carol’s allegedly
clever foreign policy strategy “to place a bet on every possible winner and keep them all
guessing” did not prevent Romania’s gradual international isolation and the territorial
losses o f the summer o f 1940.
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commitments to the regional alliances. American magazines and newspapers, as well as
foreign policy journals acknowledged Romania’s strategic position in Eastern Europe and
the potential importance o f its natural resources for Germany. In 1940, The New
Republic named Romania the country “which holds the key to the whole situation in the
Danube basin.”38 O f the riverane countries, she was the only one with strong ties with the
W estern powers and especially France. Also, Romania’s geographic position at the
D anube’s outlet into the Black Sea was vital for Germany’s or Russia’s expansion to the
Bosphorus and Dardanelles and from there into the Middle East. Peter Drucker opined
that the Nazis sought the domination o f the countries o f the Lower Danube because “it
was the only way to make German “Wehrwirtschaft” work in time o f w ar or severe
internal stress, by insuring an adequate and dependable supply o f foodstuffs and raw
materials when all other sources were blocked.”39
The American journalist Vernon McKenzie stressed the importance o f Romanian
oil in any future European war: “Oil in tremendous and overflowing quantities was the
backbone o f Rumanian wealth and was the prize which half a dozen European countries
were seeking to possess, or control, in the event o f another World W ar.”40 Oil, together
with grains, were repeatedly cited by journalists and diplomats as Romania’s main riches.
These resources made her indispensable for Hitler’s war preparations in the last years o f
the 1930s. Concerning the particular importance o f Romanian oil to Hitler, Jonathan
Griffin o f The Nation asserted, “In Rumania lay the only large oil wells in non-Russian

38 The N ew Republic. January 4, 1940, p. 245.
39 Drucker, “Can Germany Win?,” p. 148.
40 McKenzie, p. 128.
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Europe. Hitler wanted to get those oil wells, and to get them intact. He would therefore
try to do without armed invasion—try to make Rumania, by simple threats, produce and
deliver oil to meet his needs.”41 At the same time, Romanian grains were necessary to
feed the German people whose own food resources were inadequate. As Anne
M cCormick remarked, “Rumanian oil, wheat, and Black Sea ports were vital to the
Germans in prosecuting the war.”42
After Poland’s destruction, in September and October 1939, American diplomats
and journalists considered Romania in danger o f being the next target o f the Nazi
aggression. Its precarious position was explained by the fact that it

owned too many valuable properties and was located in a strategic place. ..
It contained not only considerable oil and grain, but also iron ore, coal,
manganese, and bauxite—properties valuable in times o f war. It also
occupied the mouth o f Danube, a vital position. Finally, through its heart
ran the Carpathian Mountains, which many westerly countries regarded as
a European military barrier against invasion from the east.43

Between 1938 and 1940, American journalists analyzed in detail Romania’s foreign
policy and its possibilities for survival against the Nazi storm. The Anschluss, and
especially the Munich Agreement, made them question the future o f Romania as an
independent country. Rumors circulated that that country might be the next target on the
list o f Hitler’s conquests. The American press acknowledged the delicate position o f King
Carol after Munich and predicted his eventual strengthening o f Romania’s relations with

41 Jonathan Griffin, “Will Rumania Fight?,” The Nation. September 16, 1939, p. 285.
42 The New Y ork Times. November 25, 1939, 16.
43 Cyrus Sulzberger, “Rumania Is Beset by Many Worries,” The New York Times.
December 17, 1939, 5.
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Germany. The New Republic asserted, “King Carol, perennially the realist untroubled by
sentiment, knew that he could not long escape a decision about his relation with Hitler. ..
The fate o f Czechoslovakia had been a warning to Carol to come to terms with Hitler
while it was still time to bargain.”44 After the occupation o f Bohemia and M oravia in
March 1939, William Bullitt transmitted to Washington his opinion that the W estern
European pow ers’ main worry was Romania “which appeared to be next in line for an
attack by Germany.”45
The suspicions o f the American diplomat were shared by the American press. In
his analysis o f the German expansion in Eastern Europe, Paul Taylor admitted that the
occupation o f Bohemia and Moravia strengthened the Nazi position in the Balkans,
especially because it got closer to Romania and Poland. Germany’s economic objectives
became obvious once the March 1939, economic agreement with Romania was signed.
Paul Taylor interpreted the treaty as an important step toward Hitler’s economic control
o f Southeastern Europe providing him with raw materials and grains and “absorbing]
German finished products.”46 The worries o f American journalists intensified after the
occupation o f Poland and the invasion o f Subcarpathian Ukraine by the Soviet troops.
The N ew Y ork Times o f September 24, 1939, opined, “Rumania, one o f the richest states
o f the Balkans, appeared, because o f the German-Russian rapprochement, to be in the
most dangerous situation o f any o f those little neutrals o f Europe which were still clinging

44 “After Munich, W hat?,” The New Republic. October 26, 1938, p. 325.
45 FRUS. 1 9 3 9 .1, p. 129.
46 Paul Taylor, “Germany’s Expansion in Eastern Europe,” Foreign Policy Reports. May
15, 1939, p. 59.
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precariously to neutrality.”47 Some journalists went so far as to say that Germany was the
most interested in Romania o f all the Eastern European countries. The latter was not only
the ideal provider o f grain, timber, and oil but also had a strategic position “as a bridge to
the Soviet Union and Asia M inor.”48
Remarkably, foreign correspondents o f the time were able to see the Soviet peril
too. They could not blame the Soviet Union too much because the W estern powers hoped
to have Stalin as an ally and did not want to interfere with his expansion plans in Eastern
Europe.49 It can be argued that, unlike Nazi Germany, the Soviet jeopardy was
underestimated. After the beginning o f war, The New Republic published an article trying
to explain why the W estern powers did not consider the Soviet Union a big danger for
Eastern Europe, in spite o f its territorial pretensions. The magazine talked about “a
possible Allied campaign in the Danube Valley to stop the German blitzkrieg at the PolishRumanian frontier. To keep Russia from helping Germany, they had to agree on some
concessions and one o f them would be Bessarabia.”50 The words o f the American
magazine came true six months later when no ally helped Romania resist the Soviet
ultimatum to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.51

47 The N ew Y ork Times. September 24, 1939, 39.
48 Stoyan Pribichevich, “The Nazi Drive to the East--Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary,”
Foreign Policy Reports. October 15, 1939, p. 179.
49 In his memoirs, Cordell Hull confessed, “I did not wish to alienate Russia, feeling that at
some time she might veer away from her apparently close relationship with Germany.”
Hull, p. 702.
50 The N ew Republic. December 20, 1939, p. 258.
51The N ew York Times foreign correspondent in Bucharest, Eugen Kovacs, was among
the few journalists who noted the surprise o f Romanian and German officials over the
claim o f N orthern Bukovina by the Soviet Union. The New York Times. June 29, 1940, 8.
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The territorial cessions forced upon Romania in the summer o f 1940 were the
objects o f diverse commentaries in the American press, especially the inequitable outcome
o f the Vienna “Award.” Philip Mosely, Professor o f History at Columbia University,
w rote an article in which he analyzed the consequences o f the cession o f Transylvania for
Romania and the Balkans area. He emphasized that Hitler decided to intervene in the
Romanian-Hungarian dispute for fear o f the Soviet Union taking advantage o f the
conflictual situation to fulfill its own territorial aspirations. Mosely gave an accurate and
detailed perspective on the Hungarian claims on and the Romanian attachment to
Transylvania and demonstrated with facts and figures that the majority o f the population in
the acquired province was Romanian.52 Therefore, the American historian concluded that
“Hungary had acquired an ethnic problem almost as difficult as that o f post-1918
Rumania.”53
Mosely was a defender o f Romania’s rights to the territories ceded in the summer
o f 1940. In another article, he advocated Romania’s rightful claims to Bessarabia. The
American professor argued Romania’s right based on the history o f the province before
1812, the vote o f Sfatul Tarii (Council o f the Land) in 1918, the ethnically Romanian
majority o f the population, and the moral recognition o f Romanian sovereignty by
England, France, and Italy in 1920.54
Some journalists regarded the cession o f Transylvania and Southern Dobrudja as
necessary for peace in the Balkans. Although it sympathized with Romania’s losses, the

52 At Vienna, Hungary claimed the province exclusively on ethnic bases.
53 Philip Mosely, “Transylvania Partitioned,” Foreign Affairs 1 (October 1940): 241.
54 Mosely, “Is Bessarabia Next?,” Foreign Affairs 3 (April 1940): 561.
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media regarded the dispute between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania as
dangerous for the troubled zone o f East Central Europe. Therefore, the arbitration at
Vienna which decided in favor o f Hungary appeared necessary for the preservation o f
peace in the region. Some American magazines emphasized the fact that because o f the
Soviet peril Romania had no choice but to accept the Vienna Dictate. The “red scare”
made Romanian officials seek assistance from Germany in defending the remaining borders
o f the country.55 Sovietophile journalist Louis Fischer labeled the Diktat a “Versailles
imposed by Hitler on Rumania” which served Germany’s purpose o f getting closer to its
ultimate w ar target, Russia, and isolating Stalin from its aggrandizement objectives in the
Balkans.56 Also, from a strategic point o f view, after its acquisition o f Transylvania,
Hungary had become a threat in case Soviet troops advanced from Bessarabia and
Bukovina into Moldova, thus transforming Romania into a battlefield.
The unfavorable interpretations o f some part o f the American press were largely
due to H ungary’s permanent challenging in the U.S. media or through lobbying in
Congress o f the Trianon treaty o f 1919 which consecrated the legitimacy o f Romanian
claims on Transylvania. Hungarian-Americans regularly criticized Romania’s treatment o f
minorities and demanded the return o f Transylvania. Therefore, the U.S. press sometimes
prejudicially referred to Transylvania as “the annexed Hungarian lands.”57 The antiRomanian campaign waged by Hungarians prevented the American media from objectively

55 The N ation. September 7, 1940, p. 206. At Vienna, Germany offered Romania
complete guarantee o f its frontiers after the cession o f Transylvania was over.
56 Louis Fisher, “Rumania’s New Versailles,” The Nation. September 14, 1940, p. 206.
57 New Y ork Times. M arch 13, 1938, 35.
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reporting and analyzing the dispute over Transylvania. The number o f HungarianAmericans was larger than that o f Romanian-Americans.58 Also, the Hungarian
immigration had a powerful intellectual elite unlike Romanian immigrants who were
simple workers, with poor education and no political clout. Finally, the relationship
between American Calvinists with the native Hungarian Presbyterians and o f American
Catholics with their co-religionists in Hungary improved that country’s image in the
United States. On the other hand, the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate in the United
States had no connection with other powerful American churches. M oreover, its Bishop
and some o f his advisors circulated right-wing ideas in the Episcopate’s publications and
raised the criticism o f American media and religious organizations.
The American journalists acknowledged that the loss o f Bessarabia, and especially
o f Transylvania, led ultimately to the fall o f King Carol. Time asserted that, after the loss
o f the province, “many o f his subjects saw Carol as an arch-traitor, or as an arch-fool who
relied upon the guarantee o f Great Britain to save Rumania.”59 Nevertheless, they also
understood that King Carol had been the last chance o f Romania to bargain with Germany
and not capitulate to Nazi pressure.60

58 According to the 1930 U.S. Census, there were over 274,450 Hungarians in the United
States (0.21 percent), unlike Romanians who were only 146,393 (0:11 percent o f the total
population). U. S. Department o f Commerce. Bureau o f the Census. Sixteenth Census o f
the U.S.: 1930. Population. Volume II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1933), p. 268.
59 Time. September 16, 1940, p. 34.
60 “Carol was a vain, autocratic, and often irresponsible monarch. But,” wrote The
Nation, “in the last few years he had struggled manfully to prevent his country from falling
under Nazi domination.... King Carol’s headlong flig h t... marked the formal end o f
independent Romania.” The Nation. September 14, 1940, p. 201.
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The press did not succeed in totally annihilating the American people’s interest
about Romania. The Romanian Ministry of Propaganda and the Romanian Legation in
Washington continued to receive requests from private U.S. citizens for informative
materials concerning Romania, its culture and history. For example, in 1937 high school
student Betty Jean Olson from Seattle and Mrs. Victoria Stinos from Fresno, California,
asked the Romanian Legation in Washington to send them information about Romania to
be used in different local exhibitions.61 Also, Mrs. Pearl W. Metzelthin requested a
Romanian cookbook in order to display it at the New York World Fair o f 1939.62 Outside
the friendship societies, Romania had private friends in the United States in the late 1930s.
In January 1938, George Berchek, President o f “The American Society for Improved
International Relations” from St. Louis, Missouri, offered his contribution to the
development o f Romanian-American relations.63 Romania began to be perceived as part
o f Europe by American organizations. For example, in April 1937, Kenneth Holland, the
Vice-President o f the Commission o f American Youth, affiliated with the “American
Council on Education,” put together a brochure about youth camps in Europe. He asked
the Romanian Ministry o f Propaganda to send him information about this subject in
Romania to be included in the pamphlet.64
The American public had little contact with Romanian traditions and culture. The
New York World Fair o f 1939 was one of Romania’s rare opportunity to familiarize

61 State
62 Ibid.,
63 Ibid.,
64 Ibid.,

Archives, Bucharest, File 1945, Propaganda. Page 19.
Page 166.
Page 148.
Page 19.
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Americans with its national achievements. The Romanian exhibition opened in May 1939
and included a clever and attractive combination o f the country’s rich past, developing
present, and promising future. Two buildings contained the presentation: the official
pavilion, designed by George Cantacuzino, and the Romanian House, built by architect
Octav Doicescu. Americans willing to get the feeling o f Romanian culture could watch
the costume and folk dance parades, exhibits o f rugs, wood carvings, and ceramics. Those
interested in the Romanian cuisine could visit the Romanian House which housed a
restaurant with drinks and food prepared by famous chefs from Bucharest.65 The opening
o f the Romanian pavilion in New York at the World Fair became an occasion to express
mutual hopes for the future o f peace and understanding in the world. New Y ork’s M ayor
La Guardia encouraged the Romanians “to play their historic role in Europe and ‘resist the
barbarians.’”66 In the context o f the spring o f 1939, his message became almost an
official request for Romanian resistance to the German pressure.
In the late 1930s, American media closely followed the internal and international
situation o f Romania. They made a point o f stressing the importance o f its natural
resources for Germany’s successful pursuit o f war. Journalists also emphasized the
delicate geographical and political position o f Romania in the Balkans. Due to its location
at the Danube’s exit into the Black Sea, it possessed the strategic key to Germany’s drive
tow ard the Bosphorus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Politically,

65 Vasile Hategan, “The Romanians o f New York,” Part II, Romanian-American Heritage
Center Information Bulletin 4 (July-August 1992): 24.
66 N ew York Times. May 6, 1939, 7.

Romania was squeezed between Germany and the Soviet Union and placed in the position
o f having to choose the protection o f one or the other.
The American media was o f the opinion that King Carol’s personal dictatorship
was the most logical solution to preserving the independence o f the country and o f
containing the internal right-wing danger. Some o f the foreign correspondents o f this
period supported King Carol’s efforts to transform Romania into a prosperous and
m odem country.67 The press praised Carol’s efforts to maintain a balance between his
natural inclination toward the W estern European democracies—France and Britain—and his
forced friendship with Germany.
At the same time, the U.S. press and public organizations expressed their
discontent with Romania’s treatment o f minorities and pressured the American
government to intervene for the improvement o f human rights in Romania. The State
Department kept a cautious attitude toward this precarious issue and considered it
exclusively a Romanian problem. Nevertheless, unfavorable articles in the American press
negatively affected the image o f Romania in the United States. The American public had
little occasion, with the exception o f the New York World Fair o f 1939, to come in

67 For more information see Ernest H. Latham, Jr., “Ziaristi englezi si americani la
Bucuresti, intre anii 1938-1941” (British and American Journalists in Bucharest, 19381941), M aaazin Istoric (Historical Magazine) 10 (October 1994): 15-20. Some o f the
most important titles are: Derek Patmore, Invitation to Romania (London: Macmillan &
Co., 1939) and Balkan Correspondent (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941); Robert
Parker, Headquarters Budapest (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944); Leland Stowe,
N o Other Road to Freedom (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1942); R.G. Waldeck,
Athenee Palace (New York: Robert M. McBride & Co., 1942); Robert St. John, Foreign
Correspondent (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1957); Cedric Salter, Flight from Poland
(London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1940).
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contact with the culture o f Romania. Therefore, in the late 1930s, Romania still remained
poorly known in the United States and was often recognized only through sometimes
biased view o f the press.
N o official U.S. documents attested to the idea that American press was partly
responsible for the State Department’s cautious policy regarding Romania. For example,
although U.S. publications conducted a vigorous and vocal campaign against Romania’s
treatment o f minorities, the American government maintained a diplomatic distance from
this Romanian internal problem. At the same time, U.S. officials were not impressed by
the worries o f the press concerning the strategic importance o f Romania, if helped by the
United States and the Western European powers, in stopping the advancement o f
Germany in Eastern Europe. Therefore, from a theoretical point o f view, the general
negative press received by Romania in the interwar period and the lack o f interest
expressed by the most part o f the American public may have played a part in shaping the
American non-committal and non-involvement policy toward Romania.
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Conclusion
The development o f Romanian-American relations between 1938 and 1940 was
burdened by a series o f issues. In order to understand the coordinates on which evolved
the relationship between the two countries, one is obliged to consider both the American
perception o f Eastern Europe and the asymmetry between the interests o f Romania and
the United States.
The relationship between Romania and the United States in the late 1930s has to
be seen in the larger context o f the relationship o f the East Central European states to the
New World. The United States was a great power whose interests were worldwide but it
chose to impose limitations on its diplomacy. In the period between the two world wars
and immediately afterwards, East Central Europe was regarded as too remote a region to
awaken the interest o f American diplomacy. The U.S. perception o f the economical,
political, and cultural representation o f this region did not see it as a working reality.1
Therefore, the foreign policy decision-makers o f the State Department did not formulate a
sound strategy toward East Central Europe in the interwar period. This area had little to
offer to the United States strategically, economically, and politically. Some countries—
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia-preoccupied American officials not necessarily because
o f their economic or strategic importance but for domestic electoral purposes. M oreover,
the State Department regarded East Central Europe as part o f France’s and Great

1For more information, see Robert Ferrell, “The United States and East Central Europe
Before 1941,” in The Fate o f East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures o f American
Foreign Policy, ed. by Steven Kestesz (Indiana: University o f N otre Dame, 1956),
pp. 21-51.
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Britain’s sphere o f influence. The two European powers, especially France, had almost
exclusive authority in Eastern Europe in the interwar period.
Germany’s “Drang nach Osten” o f the late 1930s, threatening the balance o f power
in Eastern Europe, went all but unnoticed by American diplomacy. However, Washington
was forced to start to follow more closely the rapid developments in East Central Europe
and the struggle for survival o f this region’s countries even though it took few concrete
measures in 1939 and the first half o f 1940 beyond repealing some parts o f the 1937
Neutrality legislation. With some notable exceptions, the Americans still believed that
political developments in this area did not affect the United States in any way. As
historian Robert Ferrell observed, “the policy o f political unconcern continued until 1940,
by which time the entire area had been virtually partitioned by Germany, Russia, and
Italy.”2 The insignificant American interests in Eastern Europe would not require the use
o f American military force to stop the advancement o f Germany or later, the Soviet
Union. Therefore, the general Eastern European perception that the United States
deserted the region at the Yalta conference may be said to be based on the false premise o f
American interest. The American position at Yalta was consistent with the U.S. policy o f
marginalizing this region during the interwar period and immediately after World W ar II.
When thinking about Romanian-American relations, one must also keep in mind
the nature o f a big power-small power relationship. With minor exceptions, neither the
United States nor Romania had important economic and political interest in the other.
During the interwar period, the relationship between Romania and the United States was

2Ibid., p. 48.
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characterized by a fundamental and growing asymmetry o f both material and political
resources. Exports from Romania like lambskin or sugar beets did not arouse particular
interest on the American market which could import these rather insignificant items more
cheaply from closer places, like Latin America. On the other hand, the United States
offered to Romania primarily manufactured products such as machinery and automobiles
which Romanians could not afford to buy in large quantities. According to Sumner
Welles, the U.S. Undersecretary o f State in the late 1930s, “Even had the United States
adopted a positive policy designed to check the growth o f Nazi domination in Europe, it
would have had little to offer to the Balkan governments to offset the economic
arrangements proposed by Germany.”3 Also, Romania and the United States shared no
particular common political interests except a general desire for peace and economic
cooperation in the world.
In the late 1930s, Romania confronted problems o f economic development, such
as restructuring the economy-developing a powerful local manufacturing industry—,
building up monetary reserves, and diversifying exports. Romanian officials’ attempts to
solve these problems, especially those related to national defense, involved negotiations
for capital assistance translated in bilateral governmental and private loans and
investments, as well as clearing and barter agreements.
King Carol II used as bargaining power Romania’s economic and military
weakness as well as its strategic location. He tried to persuade Great Britain, France, and
eventually the United States, to help strengthen the country’s defense capabilities in order

3Welles, p. 253.
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to achieve Romania’s primary foreign policy main goal o f maintaining the territorial
“status-quo.” Romanian officials oriented their efforts toward American armament
manufacturers in order to build up Romania’s defense after September 1939. This
initiative in Romania’s arms’ imports constituted a new and original departure from
previous decades. Because the traditional armament contractors—Czechoslovakia, Great
Britain and France—had their own needs to satisfy, Romania requested American help.
Unfortunately, Romania’s meager hard currency reserves forced Romanian officials to ask
for credits or loans. American banks and private manufacturers were dubious about
Rom ania’s payment abilities due to its poor record o f loan repayment after World W ar I.
Therefore, King Carol II’s plans to supply Romania’s arsenals with American material
failed. In the summer o f 1940, lacking a market for Romanian exports and the effective
means to protect the country, the King moved toward Germany in the hope o f obtaining
armaments in exchange for oil and grain. The goal o f Romanian foreign policy to maintain
a balance between the country’s natural affinities toward W estern powers and its newly
forced association with Germany ultimately failed. In the end, Romania did not have the
necessary economic and military strength to resist the aggressive attempts o f Germany to
monopolize its natural and human resources.
The American journalists and diplomats active in the Balkans perceptively and
regularly informed the State Department about Germany’s aggressive policy toward the
East Central European states. In this context, Romania emerged as a decisive pawn in the
German march to the East. The American media and some American diplomats assigned
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to European countries repeatedly emphasized that Romania’s natural resources, such as oil
and grains, were essential to Germany’s continuing to prosecute a world war.
Even if Romania could have attracted the political and economical interest o f the
United States, it suffered during the entire interwar period from a poor public image. Its
treatment o f minorities, especially Jews and Hungarians, evoked strong criticism from the
American media and public organizations. Ethnic groups in the United States lobbied
intensely to influence the State Department to break off diplomatic relations with Romania
if their complaints were not heeded in Bucharest. The Romanian immigrant population
was too insignificant in number (only 147,000 in 1930) and too centered in specific areas—
Detroit, Cleveland—to have an influence on American national politics. M oreover, the
majority o f Romanian immigrants in the interwar period were blue collar workers,
minimally educated and politically uncultured. In the late 1930s, Romania’s image as an
exotic, politically and ethnically troubled, and little known Balkan kingdom remained
unchanged for the American public.
The United States did not have any great strategic, military, or economic interests
in Romania at the time o f Germany’s rapid advance in the Balkans. Despite the warnings
o f the American press and diplomats, the State Department was content only to watch
cautiously the events in East Central Europe and had no determined or active policy to
prevent its falling into Germany’s sphere o f influence. The lack o f a powerful lobby in
Congress, the small number o f immigrants compared to other Eastern European countries,
the distance between Romania and the United States as well as the negative image
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disseminated by the press contributed to the constant lack o f interest o f American
diplomats and private businessmen toward Romania during 1938 and 1940.
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